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DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DDC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

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£ 1 RE SUPPRESS ION SYMPOS I DM * REPORT,

24-25 July 1979) „ I

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Prepared By

Directorate of Combat Developments U&J ■Me Id Artillery School*/

Port Sill, Oklahoma 71503 14 January 1980

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION

PAGE

I. FOREWORD 1-1

II. FIRE SUPPRESSION SYMPOSIUM SCHEDULE II-l

III. FIRST SESSION - PRESENTATIONS III-l

A. Methodology for Quantifying Suppressive Effects III-A-1

of Artillery

B. Suppression in the TRADOC III-B-1

C. Suppression Testing III-C-1

D. Suppression Modeling v/Data from Yom Kippur War III-D-1

E. Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) III-E-1

F. Human Behavior in Combat III-F-1

IV. WORK GROUP SUBJECTS AND PARTICIPANTS IV- 1

V. SECOND AND THIRD SESSIONS - WORK GROUPS' RESULTS V-l

A. Group Is Suppression Variables (Effects) V-A-l

B. Group II: Suppression Variables (Causes) V-B-l

C. Group III: Data Base Requirements V-C-l

D. Group IV: Suppression Modeling V-D-l

E. Croup V: Suppreasion/Countersuppresslon Combat and V-E-l

Training Developments

VI. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL - APPENDICES A THRU G VI-1

SECTION Is FOREWORD

On 24 and 25 July 1979 a Fire Suppression Symposium hosted by the Directorate of Combat Developments (USAFAS) was held at Fort Sill. The purpose of the symposium was to arrive at a unified approach for studying the suppressive effects of fires on the modern battlefield.*-^. total of 50 individuals participated in the five work groups with approximately \

40 members from the civilian and military analytical community outside ) of Fort Sill. — * - - — ~ .

^>Tha symposium was divided into three sessions. with the first session being devoted to presentations by six participants. \ (The sixth presenta¬ tion was made during the evening of the first day.) ^At the conclusion of the firet session the participants arrived at a consensus definition of "suppression." It was "Suppression is the process of temporarily degrading unit or individual combat performance through psychological and physical means." The symposium members also decided that within the framework of the definition the focus of the work groups would be on the direct fire and indirect fire aspects of suppression. Electronic warfare, psychologi¬ cal operations, and obscuration ware considered, but it was decided thut because of the limited amount of time allotted, the discussion of them would be deferred.

In the second session participants worked in their five work groups centering attention on their specific subject area df as shown in the table ) of contents (Section V), The second session terminated group activities J for the first day of the symposium. Reports on the proceedings of each / group were collected and reproduced.

9*t the beginning of the third session the participants received a re¬ produced copy of the proceedings of each group's effort up to that point.

In this manner "cross-fertilisation" between groups was effected. sAcain the participants met in their respective groups, finnllzed their work, and adjourned to the Combined Arms Room where each work group leader \

presented a summary of hia group's effort, ,.J

In addition, there were other materials submitted, but not presented at the symposium, fheoe materials are included in Section VI of this report.^

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SECTION II: FIRE SUPPRESSION SYMPOSIUM

SCHEDULE

Fort Sill, Oklahoma

24 July
0800-0830	Inprocessing
0840-0850	Opening Remarks	MG Jack N. Merritt CAR, Room 115, Snow Hall
0900-0930	"Methodology for Quantifying Suppressive Effects of Artillery"	Mr. Landry, SPC
0930-1000	"Suppression In the TRADOC"	Mr. Roger Willis, TRASANA
1000-1030	Coffee Break
1030-1100	"Suppression Testing"	Dr. Marlon Bryson, CDEC
1100-1130	"Suppression Modeling w/Data from Yom Kippur War"	Mr. Paul Kunselman, AMSAA
1130-1200	"SEAD"	LTC Redding, USAF
1200-1330	Lunch
1330-1630	Working Groups
1900-2100	Dinner "Human Behavior in Combat"	COL Trevor Dupuy
25 July
0800-1000	Working Croups
1000-1030	Coffee Break
1030-1200	Summary of Work Groups	Combined Arms Room,

Room 115, Snow Hall

11-1

SECTION III: FIRST SESSION-PRESENTATIONS

)te. In order to stimulate the thoughts of the participants, six of them were asked to present the results of their study of suppression. For the first four speeches only the paper copies of the transparencies used were provided by the speakers; however, transcripts of the last two speeches were made available! The titles of the speeches along with the natnes of the speakers appear below in the order in which they were presented.

"Methodology for Quantifying Suppressive Effects of Artillery" -

Mr. Clifford J. Landry, Director, Land Systems Division, Systems Planning

Corporation.

"Suppression in the TRADOC" - Mr. Roger Willis, Operations Research Analyst, Chief Phenomenology and Modal Processes Branch (TRASANA) .

"Suppression Testing" - Dr. Marion Bryson, Scientific Advisor, HQ, USACDEC.

"Suppression Modeling w/Data from Yom Kippur War" - Mr. Paul KunBelman, Physicist with Tactical Operations Office, AMSAA.

"Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)" - LTC Kenneth Redding, United States Air Force Representative at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

"ruman Behavior in Combat" - COL (Ret) Trevor N. Dupuy, Noted Author, President, T.N. Dupuy Associates.

A. "Methodology for Quantifying Suppressive Effects of Artillery' Mr. Clifford J. Landry, Director, Land Systems Division, Systems Planning Corporation.

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B. "Suppression in Che TRADOC" -Mr. Roger Willis, Operations Research Analyst, Chief of Phenomenology and Model Processes Branch (TRASANA)

SUPPRESSION IN TRADOC MODELS

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ACTIVITIES SUPPRESSED							NOT DIRECT
FIRE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		YES	YES	YES
MOVE	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES		YES	NO	NO	NO
OBSERVE	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES		NO	YES	NO	NO
COMMUNICATE	NO	NO		NO	?		NO	FDC	NO	NO
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE	?	?	NO?	NO?	YES		NO	NO	NO	NO
EFFECTS
DURATION OF	EXP.	STOCH	STOCH	MATRIX	|		MATRIX	MATRIX		EXP.?
SUPPRESSION	STOCK?			INPUT	?		INPUT	INPUT	?
CONDITIONS
TYPE OF ROUND			3	3	X		3	4?	NO
NO. OF ROUNDS					X		X	X	NO
TARGET TYPE			X	X	4		5	5?	4?
TYPE OF ENGMT									X
ATKR OR DEFNDR									2
FORCE RATIO									X
MISS DISTANCE		?			GROSS		NO	?	NO
TARGET COVER			3	3
NON-LETHAL HITS		?	X					X
KILL PROB.	X	X								X
HUMAN FACTORS	X									X
ELEMENTS NOT
SUPPRESSED	ARTY	ARTY	ARTY .	ARTY			MNVR		?

IlI-a-3

FOURCE SUPPRESSION

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8 INCH	14	6
155 MM	13	l
81 MM	11	0.70
105 MM (TANK)	11	0.80
50 CAL. MG (5 rdg)	4	0.06

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CONCLUSIONS

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SLIDE #1

CCEC

SUPPRESSION

EXPERIMENTATION

slide n

TYPES OF SUPPRESSION

- REASONED SUPPRESSION

- UNREASONED SUPPRESSION

- PHYSICAL SUPPRESSION

III-C-2

SLIDE //I

DATA DESIRED

- PROXIMITY

- ^ 50%

- ) 90%

- VOLUME

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- > 90%

SLTDE #4

EXPERIMENTS

I)UCS

DACTS

SASF.

SUP EX I SUPEX III

m-c-3

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DUCS

- SIMUIATED FIRE

- SOUND RECORDINGS

- TASK LOADING

- USE OF ACTUAL WEAPON

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- LIVE FIRE

- PLAYERS WITH PERISCOPES

- CONCEALED AND OPEN

- ATTACH BY WEAPON SQUAD

- VARIABLE DISPERSION

lll-C-4

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SLIDE in

S A S E

- LIVE FIRE

- RIFLES AND MACHINE Cl' NS

- STEREOTYPE SCENARIO

- CLOSE CONTROL OVER MISS DISTANCE

- IMPACTINC AND OVERHEAD ROUNDS

- PATTERN AND VOLUME OF FIRE

- DAY AND NIGHT

- INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT SUPPRESSION

- COMBAT TRAINING

SLIDE If 8

SUP EX I

- LIVE FIRE

1

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SLIDE #9

SUPEX III

- INDIRECT FIRE ONLY

- EQUIVALENT CHARGE DETONATIONS

ASPECT TO SUPPRESSEE

- SINGLE ROUND AND VOLLEY

SLIDE 15*10

MATHEMATICAL EQUATION

RMD - Ac BP<S>

WHERE

RMD - RADIAL MISS DISTANCE

A,B - FITTED PARAMETERS

r(S) - PROBABILITY OF SUPPRESSION

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III-C-6

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PROXIMITY REQUIRED FOR SUPPRESSION (DIRECT FIRE)

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PROXIMITY REQUIRED FOR SUPPRESSION (INDIRECT FIRE)

WEAPON		P(S) - .5			F(S) -	.9
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81MM	72	87	58	34	41	15
105 HOW	118	91	51	55	46	21
105 HEP-T	93	93		43	49
2.75"	84	83		43	44
155MM	144	106	104	77	72	63
8 IN.	392	257		169	126

III-C-7

ANGLE OF NO. C

CALIBER

MISS __ DISTANCE

FRACTION OF

TARGET KILLED

TARGET DENSITY

I (LITTON ^ MODEL)

SUPPRESSION

PROBABILITY

CDEC SUPPRESSION EXPERIMENTATION BY Marion R. Bryson ABSTRACT

During the years 197S - 1978, the US Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command conducted a series of experiments to study the phenomenon of suppression. This paper describes briefly the experiments, the reports generated, and the availability of these reports.

1. INTRODUCTION:

Starting in 1975, USACDEC, Fort Ord, California, began a study of the effects of direct and indirect fire suppression. The purpose of this series of experiments was to evaluate what was called "reasoned suppression". Reasoned suppression was defined as that suppression resulting from a conscious decision by the suppressee to take cover because of perceived physical danger. This is as opposed to physical suppression (injury, death, obscuration) and unreasoned suppression (panic, fear, etc.). These experiments culminated in a series of reports. These reports are summarized in the following paragraphs. Following that is a brief comparison of the results of each of the report.

2. SUMMARY OF REPORTS:

a. Degradation Under Control Stimuli (DUCS) , April 1975

(1) Purpose : This experiment was conducted to determine capability and methodology to conduct suppressive- type ex¬ periments and to compare the relative suppressive effects

of the .50 cal and 7.62mm machineguns.

(2) Objective :

(a) To determine CDEC's current capabilities to induce suppressive effects during field experimentation.

(b) To identify current shortcomings in instrumentation, equipment, and methodology.

CDEC Suppression Experimentation

(c) To identify feasible approaches for correcting existing shortcomings.

(d) To obtain subjective opinions of the suppressive effects of selected small arms.

(e) To examine the suppressive effects of the .50 cal. machinegun simulated experimentally.

(f) To examine the suppressive effects of the 7.62mm machinegun simulated experimentally.

(g) To evaluate the relative suppressive effects of the 7.62mm machinegun simulated experimentally.

(3) Description :

(a) DUCS was a simulated live-fire experiment designed to evaluate the relative non-lethal suppressive effects

of machinegun fire on an ATM gunner. A total of 48 record and 12 baseline trials were conducted.

(b) In each trial, two players, in the roles of ATM gunners, were evaluated on their ability to observe and simulate firing at attacking threat vehicles while being engaged by simulated fire.

(c) The threat consisted of two armored reconnaissance vehicles which advanced on the players' position utilizing the bounding overwatch technique. The sequence in which the threat vehicles moved and fired was developed based on the bounding overwatch technique and maximum use of the terrain for cover and concealment.

(d) Players were carefully selected to insure proper motivation, intelligence, experience and aural and visual acuity.

(4) Major Findings; The major findings in this ex¬ periment were provided in terms of answers to questions designed to satisfy experimental objectives as follows:

(a) To what degree do the effects of .50 cal. machine- gun fire degrade the performance of an enemy antitank gunner? When subjected to simulated ,50 cal. machinegun fire, the mean tracking (productive) time of player personnel was degraded approximately 57 percent.

iii-c-io

CDEC Suppression Experimentation

(b) To what degree do the effects of 7.62mm machinegun fire degrade the performance of an enemy antitank gunner?

(1) When subjected to simulated 7.62mm machinegun fire, the mean tracking time of player personnel was degraded approximately 61 percent.

(2) When subjected to the fire of a 7.62mm machinegun firing blanks, the mean tracking time of player personnel was degraded approximately 44 percent.

(c) Which machinegun is the more suppressive weapon under controlled conditions? Using the same volume and technique of fire, it was not possible to detect a statisti¬ cally significant difference between the suppressive effects of the two weapons examined.

(5) Report Availability: This was an internal CDEC

methodology study. The final report is available for exami¬ nation at Fort Ord.

b. Dispersion Against Concealed Targets (DACTS) , July 1975

(1) Purpose: DACTS was conducted to provide data to the US Army Infantry School (USAIS) for analysis to determine the impact of various dispersion levels on the effectiveness of thi future rifle system.

(2) Objectives :

(a) To provide data to evaluate the impact, of variations of the man/rifle system's effective three-round burst dis¬ persion on the effectiveness of the individual rifleman against various types of threats.

(b) To provide data on the phenomenon of suppression inducted by the effect of small arms fire.

(3) Description : .DACTS was designed to provide data to evaluate semi-automatic fire and six burst dispersions obtained with modified M16 rifles (4.32mm) and standard M16A1 rifles. The experiment was conducted on three live- fire ranges. Types of targets engaged were concealed stationary, visible stationary and visible moving. Addi¬ tionally, the experiment provided data on the suppressive

lil-C-ll

CDF-C Suppression Experimentation

effects of the weapons employed and, through side tests, provided data on the distribution of personnel in an attacking squad (TERTEST) , training implications related to engaging moving targets (Moving Target Range Side Test), and the ability of personnel to discern the proximity of rifle fire (Round Locating Side Test).

0

(4) Major Find ings :

(a) Data and information collected in DACTS were keyed to the following questions:

1 What level of dispersion maximizes the effective¬ ness of the individual rifleman engaging visible targets?

2 What level of dispersion maximizes the effective¬ ness of the individual rifleman engaging concealed targets?

£ What level of dispersion maximizes the effective¬ ness of the fire team engaging visible targets?

£ What level of dispersion maximizes the effective¬ ness of the fire team engaging concealed targets?

(b) A preliminary data analysis indicated trends in the effects of burst dispersion on the performance of both the individual rifleman and the infantry fire team. However, a full data analysis was conducted by USAIS which provided conclusions and inferences on the specific effects of the variations in burst dispersions,

(5) Report Availability : A copy of the report may be

obtained from bDd. ( A D : b b 05 701)

c. Suppression Experimentation Data Analysis (DAR) Report, April 1976. t

(1) Purpose : The DAR provides the results of a data analysis on the suppressive effects of direct and indirect fire on soldiers under simulated combat conditions.

(2) Obj ectives :

(a) To determine the proximity of fire, in meters, re¬ quired to suppress an antitank glided missile (ATGM) gunner with probability of 0.S and prob ility of > 0.9.

II1-C-12

CD EC Suppression Experimentation

(b) To determine the volume of fire required to obtain SO percent and 90 percent suppression of ATGM gunners.

(3) Description ;

(a) The analytical results in this report addressed several types of suppression:

1^ Physical Suppression. Degradation of performance of an~individual or unit due to physical incapacitation such as death, injury, obscuration, or other physical constraints.

2 Unreasoned Suppression. Degradation of performance of an“individual or unit due to immediately uncontrollable psychological or physiological factors such as panic, fear, fatigue, etc.

^ Reasoned Suppression. Temporary degradation in the quality of performance of a soldier or unit due to avoidance of a perceived threat from enemy weapon systems.

Cb) Data used in the analysis contained in this report came from several suppression experiments conducted by CDEC. The experiments included are the Small Arms Suppression Experiment, Phase II (SASE II); Suppression Experiment, Phase I (SUPEX I) ; Suppression Experiment, Phase II (SUPEX II); and /rtillery CDEC Experiment, Suppression (ACES),

,(4) Major Findings : The data analysis revealed that:

(a) The probability of suppression is influenced by the proximity of fire in an ordered and predictable manner.

(b) The proximity of fire or radial miss distance in meters can be modeled by an experimental equation.

(S) Report Availability: A copy of this report may be obtained from DDd (A10T' ITT O' 57 9L) .

d. Suppression, July 1976

(1) Purpose : This bulletin is designed to provide

commanders and troops in the field with an understanding and appreciation for the importance of suppression.

(2) Objectives :

(a) To provide information on the techniques of employing weapons in suppression roles and the relative suppressive ca¬ ll j-c-l 3

CDEC Suppression Experimentation

pabilities of various weapons and countermeasures available to reduce the suppressive effects of enemy fire.

(b) To discuss training implications.

(3) Description :

(a) The information contained in this bulletin is based upon the results of a number of live fire field experiments conducted by the US Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command in 1975 and 1976.

(b) The bulletin presents various combat situations and then suggests different options the commander may exer¬ cise to provide suppressive fires and reduce enemy effective¬ ness.

(4j Major Findings; The findings in this bulletin are p r e s en t ed” i n t e rms of th e results obtained after exercising various options in a given combat situation.

(5) Report Availability : A copy of this report may be obtained from the USXCDEG Library.

e. Small Arms Suppression Evaluation Phase II (SASE II), August 1976

i •'

(1) Purpose ; The SASE II experiment was conducted to provide data on the suppressive effects of the M16A1 (5.56mm) rifle, the M60 (7.62mm) machinegun and the M2(,50 cal) machine gun.

(2) Objectives :

(a) To obtain and quantify the level, duration and thres¬ hold of the suppressive effects that selected direct fire weapons have on defending infantry.

(b) To identify and quantify the effects that selected variables have on the suppressive effects of selected direct, fire weapons employed against defending infantry.

(3) Description : For this experiment, suppression is defined as! The temporary degradation in the quality of performance of an individual due to avoidance of a perceived threat. Empirical data were collected on the ability of soldiers to perform combat-related tasks while receiving fire. The conditions under which the fire was delivered

Z

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CDEC Suppression Experimentation

were controlled and varied by the experiment design. There¬ fore, data collected on variations of performance are mea¬ sures of suppression. The experiment was conducted in eight parts with each part designed to contribute selected data in support of the overall purpose and objectives of the experiment. During each part., the suppressive effects of fire delivered against infantrymen concealed in defensive positions were evaluated. Two supplemental data analysis reports were also prepared for the SASE II Experiment:

(a) SASE II Analysis Report (Vol II ) July 1976

(b) BDMSC SASE II Analysis Report August 1976

(4) Major Findings:

(a) The M2 machinegun was shown to be significantly more suppressive than the M60 machinegun, which in turn, was significantly more suppressive than the M16A1 rifle.

(b) The number of rounds (e.g., 3 vs. 6) of ball ammuni¬ tion per burst of automatic fire has little or no effect on the suppressiveness of the fire. However, the time interval (e.g., 4 sec vs. 12 sec) between bursts has a significant effect,

(c) Suppresive fire delivered in small bursts with shurt time intervals between bursts appears to be most efficient for delivering suppressive fires.

(d) The degree that a soldier is suppressed by incoming fire can be approximated by a mathematic; l model which in¬ cludes the natural logarithm of his distance to the incoming fire.

(e) Classes (or techniques) of fire affect the suppressive¬ ness of the fire. Classes of fire which result in a random distribution of fire throughout the target area are more suppressive than classes which result in fire being distri¬ buted in a systematic pattern.

(f) Soldiers who have received indoctrination stressing the lethality and dangerousness of weapon systems are more suppressed (401) by the systems than soldiers who have not been indoctrinated.

(g) Soldiers operating independently were found to be more suppressed (43% to 115%) under similar conditions than collocated soldiers operating in groups.

I1I-C-15

CDEC Suppression Experimentation

(h) Soldiers defending from frontal parapet foxholes were significantly less suppressed (624) than soldiers de¬ fending from standard foxholes.

(i) Suppression is affected both by the overall situa¬ tion under which fires are delivered and by the individual bursts of fire.

(5) Report Availability: (AD B013211)

The availability of these reports are as follows:

(a) SASE II Experimental Report - DDC (AD BQ132102)

(b) SASE il Analysis Report (Vol II) - USACDEC Library

(c) BDMSC SASE II Analysis Report - USACDEC Library

f. Suppression Experiment (SUPEX), February 1977

(1) Purpose: The SUPEX experiment was conducted to pro vide comparative evaluations of the suppressive effects of selected weapon systems ranging from the M16A2 rifle to the 8-inch Howitzer.

(2) Objectives :

(a) To determine the proximity of fire required to suppress a threat antitank missile gunner with a single round or burst with probabilities of .5 and .9.

(b) To determine the volume of fire required bv each weapon1 system to sustain 50 % and 901 suppression of a threat element employing antitank guided missiles along 100m and SOOm fronts.

(3) Description : SUPEX was conducted in two phases. During Phase I, the W16A1 rifle, M3 submachinegun , .50 cal. machinegun (MG), 20mm cannon, and 40mm High Velocity Gre¬ nade Launcher (HVGL) were evaluated. The latter three weapons were tested with the players located in individual protective bunkers and by firing at targets immediately to their front. A silhouette target, which represented the player and over which he had control, was placed directly in front of the bunker and electrically wired in such a manner that when the player raised his periscope, tho silhouette went up and when the player lowered his periscope

TII-C-16

COEC Suppression Experimentation

the silhouette went down. The players' mission was to acquire target tanks and simulate firing an antitank missile at these targets located at ranges of approximately 1400 meters. The players were instructed to respond to in¬ coming rounds by lowering or raising their periscopes as they believed they would if they were the silhouette immediately to the front of their foxhole. The raising and lowering of the periscopes was automatically recorded and an analysis performed on the percent of the players that suppressed as a function of the distance that a round impacted from the player's silhouette.

(4) Mai or Findings : The findings were presented in the form of probability curves and data tables. These findings revealed the proximity within which single rounds and five- round bursts of various weapon systems must impact to achieve a .5 and .9 probability of suppression.

(5) Report Availability: A copy of this report may be obtained FfonTUD'C (BO 17 11 6 JT

g. Suppression Experimentation Supplemental Data Analysis (SESDA) , May 1977

(1) Purpose : The SESDA report was prepared to provide

su] pression data results from selected trials of the Small Arm? Suppression Experiment (SASH II) conducted by CDEC.

(2) Obj ectives :

(a) To determine the proximity of fire, in meters, re¬ quired to suppress an individual infantryman with probability of 0.5 and probability of 0.9 under each of the experimenta¬ tion conditions.

(b) To determine the effects on the suppression of infantrymen due to:

Rate of fire

2^ Selected patterns of weapon fire 3 Type of ammunition at night.

I1I-C-17

CDEC Suppression Experimentation

(3) Description : Empirical data were collected on the

ability of soldiers to perform combat related tasks while receiving fire. The conditions under which the fire was delivered were controlled and varied by the experiment design. Data collected on performance variations provide measures of the effects of the experiment treatments on suppression. The experiment was conducted in parts with each part designed to contribute selected data in support

of the overall purpose and objectives of the experiment.

(4) Major Findings;

(a) In general, a six-round burst of fire from the M2 machinegun has a higher probability of suppressing players than a six-round burst from the M60 machinegun under all conditions examined.

(b) The probability that a six-round burst would suppress players generally decreased for both the M2 and M60 machinegun as the radial miss distance of the impacting fire increased.

(c) Generally, bursts of fire using the traversing patterns had a higher probability of suppressing players at a given miss distance than bursts of fire using the pseudorandom techniques of fire.

(d) In general, bursts of fire directed overhead by the M60 machinegun at a player's position had relatively the same probability of suppressing the player as did bursts of fire directed into the berm forward of the player.

(5) Report Availability: A copy of this report may

be obtained from the CDEC Library.

h. Suppression Experiment IIIA (SUPEX IIIA), June 1978

(1) Purpose : The SUPEX IIIA Experiment was conducted to determine the methodology which would provide the most credible field environment to gather suppression data while insuring adequate player safety.

(2) Objectives :

(a) To compare the probabilities of suppressing an ATGM gunner (with simulated rounds) when using an "open" versus a "closed" foxhole.

II1-C-18

CDEC Suppression Experimentation

(b) To compare the probabilities of suppressing an Antitank Guided Missile (ATGM) gunner in a covered foxhole when high explosive projectiles were detonated and when simulated rounds were detonated.

(3) Description : SUPEX IIIA was a methodology

experiment designed to compare individual responses to suppression effects induced by selected live, indirect fire munitions (81mm and 155mm) and their simulated rounds,

and to evaluate two foxhole types. Also, to select the best techniques and procedures to be used in future suppression experiments while insuring the absolute safety of the players.

(4) Major Findings:

(a) There is no statistically significant difference between live round, closed foxhole conditions, and the simulated round, closed foxhole condition with a 81mm round.

(b) There is no statistically significant difference between the open and the closed foxhole using a simulated 81mm round.

(c) There is no significant difference between live rounds closed foxhole and simulated rounds closed hole.

(d) The simulated/closed condition is significantly less suppressive than the simulated/open condition for the .15Smm round.

(5) Report Availability: A copy of this report may be obtained from the CDEC Library.

i. Suppression Experiment 1 1 1 B (SUPEX 1 1 1 B) , November

1978

(1) Purpose : The SUPEX 1 1 1 B was conducted to generate data and measure the reasoned suppression produced by statically detonated surface bursts of bOmm mortar, 81min mortar, lOSmm Howitzer, and 155mm Howitzer rounds.

(2) Objectives :

(a) To determine the probability of suppressing an Antitank Guided Missile (ATGM) gunner with single rounds as a function of detonation distance and aspect angle from the gunner.

Ill-C-19

COEC Suppression Experimentation

(b) To gain insights into the probability of suppressing an ATGM gunner with volley fires from 105mm and 155mm Howitzers (surface burst).

(c) To gain insights into the effect of obscuration on the probability of suppressing an ATGM gunner with the various type detonations. This objective was added to the test after the project analysis was published.

(3) Description: The experiment was designed to examine the players ' responses induced by the exploding si¬ mulated munitions. It was a one-sided live fire experiment employing statically detonated 60mm, 80mm, 105mm, and 155mm simulated rounds. These simulated rounds were detonated as

5 round bursts. Player personnel were placed in open foxholes n close proximity to the detonating munitions. Using an instrumented prototype sight, players were required to detect and simulate engagement of a moving target vehicle while sta¬ tically detonated munitions were exploded on the ground at specified distances and aspect angles from his position.

Limited volley fire trials were executed to gain insights into the effects of volley fire (105mm and 155mm simulated rounds) compared to single round fire on the reaction of an individual soldier. It was assumed that 6 tubes of artillery would fire a volley at a given point with no adjustments being made on the impacting rounds. ,

(4) Major Findings:

(a) For any given range and round size, the most suppressive detonations observed were directly in front of the player (0 degrees), The observed least suppressive detonation varied for each round size, but always behind the player. (The least suppressive aspect angle for 60mm, 81mm, 105mm and 155mm was 180, 150, 180 and 210 degrees, respectively)

(b) The most suppressive detonations during the volley fire were located to the player’s front (0 degrees) and the least suppressive detonations were generally at 90 or 180 degrees.

(c) For single round detonations, when obscuration of the target vehicle was reported, the angle between the target vehicle and the detonation measured from the player's vantage point was generally between + 45 degrees.

11I-C-20

btiiiuiiaMlmjliilitii.ii ,..r >'

. ..‘.L-.it .. t j.v. '• t* * . -V .Ml LL

\ i

CDEC Suppression Experimentation

(d) Human factors questionnaire results and individual interviews showed the players regarded the experiment as a very realistic training, particularly during the volley trials.

(5) Report Availability: obtained From" DT5C ( B Or^ITy.

A copy of this report may be

3. RESULTS SUMMARY : Table I shows the weapons which are treated in each oT the reports described in the preceding paragraphs. Tables II and III compare the results of these experiments. DAR is the Data Analysis Report based on several sources of suppression data.

m-c-21

TABLE I

PROXIMITY OF FIRE REQUIRED FOR GIVEN PROBABILITY OF SUPPRESSION

WEAPON	DAR	PCS')-. SUPEX	50 SUPEX I.II	DAR	P(S)« SUPEX	. 90 SUPEX
M-3	3	1 ±	0	0	0	0
M- 16A1	3	1	0	0	0	0
M-2	24	26	0	5	8	0
Ml 3 9	30	39	0	7	14	0
MK1 9	59	70	0	9	20	0
60mm	35	48	46	21	24	16
81mm	72	87	58	34	41	15
105 How	118	91	51	55	4 6	21
105 HEP-T	93	93	0	43	4 9	0
2.75"	84	83	0	43	44	0
155mm	144	106	104	77	72	63
8"	392	257	0	169	126	0

TABLE II II1-C-23

VOLUME OF FIRE NECESSARY TO CAUSE GIVEN PERCENT OF SUPPRESSION OVER A 100 (or 500) METER FRONT (RDS per minute)

50t 901

WEAPON	FRONT	DAR	SUPEX	DAR	SUPEX
M-3	100	103	135	342	450
M-16A1	100	68	128	293	413
M* 2	100	23	25	75	100
M139	100	19	25	63	75
MK19	100 •	16	25	45	50
60mm	500 .	17	IS	47	50
81mm	500 *	8	10	24	25
105 How	500	5	10	15	2S
105 HEP-T	500	6	10	19	25
2.75"	500	7	10	20	30
155mm	500	4	10	12	25
8"	500	2	5	5	10

For larger caliber indirect fire weapons, the two integrating techniques differ markedly. The repetition of the 10 and the 2S in the SUPEX is a peculiarity of the scenario used, not an indication that those weapons are equally effective.

TABLE III Ill-C-24

"Suppression v/Datfl from Yom Kippur War" - Mr Paul Kunselman, Physicist with Tactical Operations Office, AMSAA

SI, IDF, II 1

IIS ARMY MATERIEL SYSTKMS ANALYSIS ACTIVITY SUPPRESSION ESTIMATES IN DIVLEV P. KUNSELMAN T. ROUSE K . BUTLER

SLIDE 112

SUPPRESSION BY EIRE IN DIVLEV

o DIRECT KIRK SUPPRESSION OF DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS

o ARTILLERY SUPPRESSION OF MANEUVER UNITS (DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS)

o ARTILLERY SUPPRESSION OF ARTILLERY WEAPONS

SLIDE II 3 DIVLEV OVERVIEW o TWO SIDED WARGAME

o PLAYER CONTROLLED, COMPUTER ASSISTED o RESOLUTION - COMPANY MANEUVER UNITS - ARTILLERY BATTERY o SEVERAL DIVISIONS ON EACH SIDE 2 PRIMARY PRODUCT - DETAILED TIME DEPENDENT COMBAT SCENARIOS

II1-L-2

SI, 1 DK ///,

SUPPRESSION BY FIRE FEAR - PRUDENCE - OBSCURATION

SLIDE // 5

DIRECT FIRE - > DIRECT FIRE

ASSUMPTIONS

o FRACTION OF DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS IN SUPPRESSED STATE (\)

. . “ CK (X)

X =l-o

C>0, SUPPRESSION CONST.

F(X) =$ SOME FUNCTION OF SUPPRESSING FORCE STRENGTH, (X)

o ATTACKING FORCE: DEFENDING FORCE = 1:1

o DEFENDER NOT "HARDENED" BUT IN HASTY PREPARED DEFENSIVE SITE

o THE ATTACKING CDR WILL MAXIMIZE THE NUMBER OF ATTACKERS REACHING THE DEFENDER'S POSITION BY ALLOCATING 1/1 OF ATTACKING FORCE TO RESERVE & OVERWATCH AND 2/3 OF ATTACKING FORCE TO ASSAULT.

111-11-3

SLIDE II 6

DESIGN SCENARIO

DEFENDER (M)

ATTACKER (N)

KILL RATE

SLIDE #7

DIRECT FIRE SUPPRESSION CONSTANT Po = .036 DEFILADE TANKS K I Li ED/M I N/TANK l/l'N Pd - ,74 MOVING EXPOSED TANKS K I LLKD/H ! N/TANK WPN T - 5 MIN

SUPPRESSION

CONST

% DEFENDER ASSAULT FORCE

SUPPRESSED REMAINING

Y (T)

11

33%

. 16N

55

a/%

. 49N

(23% LOST)

SLIDE //«

DIRECT FIRE - -> DIRECT FIRE

FRACTION POTENTIAL KILL

TARGET SUPPRESSED FUNCTION AT TARGET

SI-1 IJIi if 9

		TANK__	LOSSES
			ACTUAL
	FORCE	STRENGTH	LOSSES	DIVLEV
CASE 1	BLUE	20	2	4.9 - i:
	RED	30	7	1.3 - 1
CASE 2	BLUE	8	3	7.5
	RED	20	11	9.8
CASE 3	BLUE	14	0	0
	RED	20	6	20

SLIDE #10 TANK LOSSES

DURATION 20-57 (60)

6 (45)

10 (53)

' STARTING

GAME	FORCE	STRENGTH
CASE 1	BLUE	20
	RED	30
CASE 2	BLUE	8
	RED	20
CASE 3	BLUE	14
	RED	20

ACTUAL DIVLEV LOSSES LOSSES

2 1.4

7 7.3

3 2.4

11 10.8

0 0

6 6.6

ACTUAL DIVLEV DURATION DURATION

60 MIN 60 MIN 45 MIN 45 MIN 53 MIN 53 MIN

SI, 1 1)K It 1 1

MANEUVER UNITS

NAB - If ARTY BTRYK TARGETED ON UNIT TPCP « #300 METER SEGMENTS IN FRONT OF

UNIT

.693 (NAB (t)/TFOP (t)) (NAB - TFCP)

.386 (NAB (t) /TFCP (t) )

(NAB =» TFCP)

i

PORTION OF UNIT SUPPRESSED IS NOT ALLOWED TO MOVE, FIRE, OR BE FIRED ON BY DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS

Sm (t) ■ 1 - e

- .5

Sa (t) ■ 1 - e

- .75

SLIDE II 12

ARTILLERY SUPPRESSION OF ARTILLERY UNITS

1BTRY vs 1 BTRY

o FIRST ATTACK; TOTAL SUPPRESSION DURING PERIOD OF

ATTACK AND SUBSEQUENT 15 MIN (SMALL DISPLACEMENT)

o SUBSEQUENT ATTACKS :

(WITHIN 5 HRS): TOTAL SUPPRESSION DURING PERIOD OF ATTACK AND SUB¬ SEQUENT 30 MIN (LARGER DISPLACEMENT)

ROUNDS MUST FUNCTION WITHIN 150 METERS OF BTRY CENTER

ARMORED ARTY, MISSIONS BEING PERFORMED ARE COMPLETED BEFORE SUPPRESSION TAKES EFFECT.

FEAR

SLIDE 1112

SUPPRESSION BY FIRE

PRUDENCE

OBSCURATION

OTHER SUPPRESSION MEANS

o SMOKE DELIVERED BY ARTILLERY o DEAD TIME - DIRECT FIRE KILL RATES o EW

o FIGHTING EFFICIENCY

1II-D-8

"Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) " - LTC Kenneth Redding, United States Air Force Repre8entativc at Fort Sill

SCAD - Lt Col Redding

General Dlngcs, Ladles and Gentlemen, this afternoon I offer a departure from this morning's speakers. That Is, I will present no models, no specific dates, nor will I get deep Into rolea and missions. Instead, I will give a report on USAF efforts In the area of Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)

, and will conclude with an Idea for your consideration as we go into our study

groups.

In February 1979, General Creech, Commander of Tactical Air Command (TAC), directed the Commander of Green Flag to begin work on a SEAD concept. Let me explain that Flag organizations in TAC are tasked with conducting exercises which evaluate units, equipment and concepts. For example, the Red Flag involves combat exercises. Blue Flag deals with command and control, Gray Flag tests maintenance, and now, Green Flag will be responsible for SEAD. In April 1979,

Green Flag queried various USAF units attached to Army Installations for Inputs into the directed study. Today, this week, there is a Green Flag conference at Eglln AFB, Florida which Is attempting to define terms and quantify data In much the same matter as we are doing In this symposium. After Grean Flag develops a command approved concept, the plan Is to test lt In a Red Flag/Blue Flag envlron- 9 ment. Now I would like to move from current efforts to future requirements.

, Name one factor that colors the entire USAF Offensive Air Support (OAS)

picture and you would have to pick the Soviet mobile SAM concept with Its redundant target coverage. It has forced us to change our tactics from those used In Southeast Asia to those presently used, i.e,, low level, In order to Increase aircraft survivability and, In the long term, OAS effectiveness.

*

I1I-E-2

--.tv, -v .

Closely linked to survivability is effective suppression which lends me to my main point: TACAIR must have suppression, specifically SEAD (SAM and AAA) in order to be effective In the hostile environment previously mentioned. Now there are, generally speaking, two ways we can obtain this suppression:

1. We (USAF) can provide SEAD ourselves by forming a Strike/Support aircraft package. This fighter group would be composed of a given number of strike aircraft led by a pathfinder or escort fighter aircraft. Accompanying the strike element would be support aircraft with specialised roles, l.e., chaff dispensing, Mlg Cap, and electronic counter measures. These aircrafts would be preceded by reconnaissance aircraft which would provide the main force with target information. Most of us can remember the large aircraft raids into North Viet Nam. For illustration purposes let's say ths raid force was 100 aircraft. That looked Impressive, 100 aircraft going up North at one time, but on closer examination you would find maybe 50 of the aircraft carrying Iron bombs? the rest were support aircraft. Now with the force just described, you could expect an acceptable degree of suppression but look at the cost. Since we deal with a finite number of aircraft we oust get the support aircraft from somewhere. So, we rob Peter to pay Paul. 2. Better that we try to maximize the number of strike aircraft available for OAS. We can do this by utilizing the other means of suppression - joint SEAD. By using Army assets, ouch as artillery, Vulcans, armed helicopter, mortars or the long range Nike, together with USAF capabilities you have the best of the two suppression systems. I conclude by restating the USAF believes in READ, we lead it to survive tomorrow's battle.

"Human Behavior in Combat" - COL (Ret) Trevor N. Dupuy Noted Author, President, T. N. Dupuy Associates

1II-F-1

HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN COMBAT:

WITH A FOCUS ON SUPPRESSION

By

Colonel T. N. Dupuy

I have been asked to provide some Insights gleaned Cron military history about human behavior In combat, aa It may be rolevant to our conference topic of "Suppression".

Before I address myself to the specifics of this, I want to make sure that you all recognize that there are tvo kinds of military history:

There la military history cited (often erroneously) to support preconceived Ideas, and there Is analytical military history based upon objective and comprehensive (as opposed to selective) assessment of nil available and relevant facts. Obviously, no one would plead guilty to serving up distorted military history. To use a non-military historical analogy, all bootleggers of the 1920's and 30'e assured their customers that they were soiling stuff right off the boat} none would admit that he was really peddling home-grown and colored, row corn whiakey.

'So, you are warned. Be skeptical about all military historical facts cited to you — Including mine. But Just because you are skeptical, don't discount 1 t ; merely make sure that you are not being sold a bill of goods.

Let ire give you some examples of distorted military history — relevant to my topic of human behavior in combat — from recent articles In military Journals.

It le popular these days to try to encourage the troopB by assuring them that it Is perfsctly reasonable to expect that we can and should be uble to fight out¬ numbered and win. My examples are of this genre of encouragement, via "military hlatory" in military journals.

In one recent article the author gave several instances of "fighting outnumbered and winning." Three particularly interested me:

3

! i

1

,<

i

1. The Spartan defense of Themopylae.

2. Wellington's victory over Napoleon at Waterloo.

3. The American recovery and victory over the German onslaught at the Battle of the Bulge, in 1944.

There is just one problem about all of these examples. The victorious side outnumbered the losing side by margins of two-to-one or greater. In all three instances the losing side hod higher combat effectiveness than the winners, but they were overwhelmed by superior numbers.

Ul-r-2

In another article, the author tried to demonstrate that relative numerical strength Is unimportant to combat outcomes by reminding the reader that in most of Cressy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World the numerically Inferior force won. If this statement were true It would be a very powerful argument.

It's too bad that In eleven of those fifteen battles the numerically superior force won.

In other words, these historical examples really demonstrated just the opposite of what the authors were trying to prove. This sort of thing can give military history a bad namaMt

On this matter of relevance of numbers, let me quote from Clausewltz - "If we... strip the engagement of all the variables arising from Its purpose and circum¬ stances, and disregard (or atrip out) the fighting valuo of the troops Involved (which Is s given quantity), ws are left with the bars concept of the engage¬ ment... In which the only distinguishing factor Is the number of troops on either side."

"These numbers, therefore, will determine victory .. .superiority of numbers in a given engagement is only one of the factors chat determines victory (but) Is the most Important factor In the outcome of an engagement, so long as It Is great enough to countarbalance all other contributing circumstances."

"This. . .would hold true for Greeks and Persians, for Englishmen end Mahrattas, for Frenchmen end Germans."*

♦Karl von ClauaawltcE, On War Book 3, Chapter 8

Over the past aaveral years I have been devoting a substantial proportion of my time to consideration of the combat "variables" mentioned by Cleusewlti considering not only those that are physical, tangible, end measurable, but those relating to whet he called "the fighting value of the troops" — in other words, the offsets of behavioral considerations on military performance and on battle out¬ comes. By physical variables I mean such things as the measurable effects of weapons, of weather, of terrain, of armored protection, of vehicle capabilities, end the like. By behavioral considerations I mean such things as the effects of surprise, leadership, training, logistics capabilities, morels, end disruption.

My colleagues end I have estimated that there are 77 types of elements or variables which Interact to produce combat outcomes and of these 18 are behavioral. If we ever find a way to calculate such things — and some day I believe we will — we will probably find the 18 behavioral far ora are potentially at least twice as Important as the 59 physical elements or a'- rets.

Although I have not yet found a way to measure consistently the effects of the variable factors that I call the "qualitative intangibles" — thosa that related to what Clausewltz called the "fighting value (or quality) of the troops", and to their leadership and control systems — I am satisfied that It la poaalble to determine an overall, consolidated qualitative intangibles In any historical battla, and that this consolidated vslue can be termed Relative Combat Effective¬ ness, or CEV. For Instance, analyses of more than 100 World War II engagements have demonstrated aome very clear patterns of relative combat effectiveness of the major participants. On the average, the Germans had a relative CEV of 1.2

III-F-3

-

vlth respect to the Western Allies -- the British and Americans. In other words, 100 Germans In ground military formations were roughly equivalent in combat capability to 120 Americans or Britishers. The average Goman CEV with respect to the Soviets was a whopping 2.5; or 100 Germans were the combat equivalent of about 250 Russian soldiers in combat units. Similarly, in analyses of about 50 engagements of the 1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars, it is evident that the Israelis had a relative Combat Effectiveness Value of about 2.0 with respect to their Arab opponents; or, 100 Israelis in ground combat units were the equivalent of about 200 Arabs.

Incidentally, It is this qualitative factor of Relative Combat Effectiveness - what Clausewitr called the fighting value of the troops - that provides the explanation for most cases In which a numerically inferior force — without the benefit of defensive posture — defeated a larger force.

This might be s good time for me to mention one of the reasons why T bell eve military history Is relevant to modern warfare, despite Its more sophisticated technology end greater lethality of weapons.

For all of the changes that have taken place in weapons over the course of recorded history, one Important element has remained constant: Man, and human behavior In the lethal environment of combat, Becauae of that constant element of war, some aspects of combat have not changed, and are as true today as they were In the time of Alexander the Great.

Thus, if we wish to forecast the effects of new technology and untested weapons on future combat, we must relate the known effects of this technology and these new weapons to those things that have net changed — the timeless verities of combat, I call them.

I hav < listed some Thirteen Timeless Verities of Combat which I believe provide a base for forecasting. But tonight I only want to mention six, which I believe are of particular importance to our purposes. These are:

1. The side which obtains the Initiative (either because of greater strength, or greater skill) can apply greater combut power at a given time and place then can its opponent.

2. Other things being equal, victory goes to the side with the combat power preponderance; i.e., if opponents are comparable in skill and weaponry, and allowance is made for defensive posture, superior numbers always win.

3. The combat power of a force which achieves surprise io substantially enhanced, and can be doubled or tripled.

4. Fire kills; fire disrupts; fire suppresses; fire causes dispersion.

5. In combat all military activites are slower, less productive, and less efficient than anticipated In peacetime tests, plans, and training exercises.

6. Combat is too complex to be described in a single, simple aphorism.

Let me amplify Just a bit about some of the behavioral factors that contribute tc these timeless verities. Of course, not all of the behavioral factors are

II I -Mi

always operative. Take, for Instance, surprise . My colleagues and I have learned from experience In analyzing a number of engagements, those In which surprise Influenced the outcome, It Is possible to discern clear-cut effects on both the mobility and vulnerability of the oppoelte forces. So, like terrain, posture, weather effects, we can assign specific (and we hope relatively precise) multiplier values to the effects of surprise on mobility and vulner¬ ability. Thus, I do not consider surprise to be an Intangible, like leadership, or training, or experience.

Therefore, I call these behavioral variables — which may or may not be opera¬ tive in an engagement — "emphemeral, reactive factors." These are emphemeral, and they are reactive, and of course (like the qualitative intangibles) they are essentially behavioral.

For the moment I am assuming that disruption caused by a combat process other than surprise will Include the effects of suppression. Further reeearch may reveal that aupprasalon la a very distinct form of disruption, that can be Dieasured or estimated quite Independently of disruption caused by any other phenomenon — ettch aa a communications breakdown, which certainly would be de¬ grading and probably disruptive.

This leads me to mention again something you may have already heard me say a couple of times: There la a need for rigor in the use of such overlapping — but not synonomous — terms as disruption, degradation and suppression.

Someone In Working Group III said ve should not let ourselves get bogged down In the details of definitions. My response 1st Let's be sure not only that we know what we are talking about, but that we can communicate with each other.

In the light of the discussions we have had. It might ba useful if I gave you my definition of suppresalon. It la similar to the one Colonel Pokomy put on the acrean, but there Is a difference that might be significant:

"Suppression Is the degradation of hostile operational capabilities through the employment of military action which has psychological or physical effects Impairing the combat performance of enemy forces and individuals who have not themselves been rendered casualties."

Note I focus tot on the means of suppression, but on the effects. Once we fully understand the effect, the means will take care of themselves.

It is not appropriate in this presentation for me to make a pitch for any particular methodology for trying to come to grips with this phenomenon of suppression. 1 have some firm Ideas about this, which I have put in the form of proposals and n "think piece" which was recently published In a profesnlonal Journal.

But - at the risk of boring those who are In Working Group II - I do think it Is appropriate for me to indicate how I think the experience of military history can help us in our efforts to corns to grips with the elusive topic.

First, let me remind you that, by analysis of historical battla outcomes, It has been possible to arrive at consistent values for the effects of surprise and of superior combat effectiveness on the battlefield. Without military

y

Ill-K-5

iw 1 LV ■' . v ■** ■ •WWtkid- •■**A*il '• Mr i*» ~

l.l It- ■ 4 .

history it would have been utterly impossible to arrive at auch quantitative values for these essentially qualitative, behavioral phenomena, ho one was able to offer more than wild guesses about these combat processes effects until my colleagues and I showed that they could be distilled from the materials available in the laboratory of the soldier: military history,

I can see no possibility of arriving at values for suppression by any process that is not equally dependent upon the resources available In this laboratory of the soldier. No test, no experiment, can possibly reproduce the* conditions which are the essence of suppression: human fear in a lethal environment,

Let me demonstrate why I believe something can be done about this matter — and at the same time demonstrate why it is important that it be done. I’ll deal with this latter point first.

It Is important that we be able to deal with the phenomenon of suppression because it undoubtedly affects battle outcomes, and if we cannot find some way of representing it in our models, then we cannot expect our models to give us results in which we can have confidence. I hope that this is self-evident. I hope that no "ne here thinks that if we cannot measure it, or reliably represent it, that it can, therefore, be ignored, or only be considered every four yearB, as suggested by Roger Willis.

Yet in effect, despite what Roger said we're largely ignoring the effects of suppression, particularly in our more aggregated models.

Take CEM, for Instance. And I mention CEM only because it provides me with an opportunity to make a very specific and very important point, net because it ia any J.es6 reliable than other models in this or any other respect.

In CEf the effect of artillery fire is represented in ammunition tonnages. In some uses of CEM, this artillery tonnage ia converted to "155HM equivalents . "

Now, then, let me refer you to a British Operations Research report of a poBt- World War II analysis of several engagements in which Buppreasive effects of artillery fire were assessed. By careful study of the data: opposite strengths, casualties, amount of artillery ammunition expended, rates of artiller. fire, nature of defensive protection, and the like, the British OR analysis were able to determine a number of critical facta about the suppressive effect of artillery fire, such us the duration and intensity of fire required to achieve n given suppressive effect.

Now, one of the things that emerged clearly from this analysis was the following, and I quota:

"There is the question of numbers of shells ae opposed to sheer weight — the age-old argument in another form of field versus medium artillery. There are u lot of jobs where the heavier shells are essential, either because of their greater range or greater penetration and explosive powers. But where lighter stuff can reach, and In capable of hurting the enemy, the evidence of these two reports seems to be that the thing that counts most of nil is the number of bangs. Clearly one 100 pounder shell it- better than one 25 pounder one. It is

Ill-r-6

on the other hand very questionable whether it 1* four timet better."*

•Number 2 Operational Research Section Report to the Army Council, "Operational research In NW Europe," London, c. 1946, p 165.

(This report, Incidentally, it available in the Morris Swett Library here at Fort Sill.)

Now, then, let's look at this British finding about suppression from historical combat analysis, to see how it is relevant to the CEM method of measuring artillery effect. If CEM were to show 100 tons of artillery ammunition fired in a target area in a given period, that could be some 400 rounds of 8" ammunition, it could be about 2,000 rounds of 155MM ammunition, or It could be approximately 4,000 rounds of 105MM ammunition. Is there anyone in this room who even without the British report — believes that the same suppressive effect can be achieved with 400 8" rounds ip a given period of time as by 4,000 105MM rounds In the same amount of time?

Dinner talks should not be long. They should be provocative. X hope I have provoked some of you into exploring how combat historical data can help us understand, measure, and represent the phenomenon of suppression.

m-h-7

SECTION IV ! WORK GROUP SUBJECTS AND PARTICIPANTS

Work Group I - Suppression Variables (Effects)

Members: Mr. Goldberg - Croup Leader

Dr. Esnderet, USA Inst Environ Medicine

Mr. Downs, BRL

Mr. Giordano, HEL

Mr. Kunselman, AMSAA

Mr. Bauman, Fort Knox

Dr. Plotkln, Mitre Corp

Colonel Buel, TRADOC/USAFAS Representative

Dr. Hegge, Walter Reed

Dr. Chambers, ARI

Work Group II - Suppression Variables (Causes)

Members: Mr. Hardison - Group Leader Colonel Crawford, TSM Smoke

Lieutenant Colonel Stokes, USA Inst Environ Medicine

Dr. Burleson, TRASANA

Mr. Garrett, AMSAA

Mr. Landry, SPC

Mr. Lynch, Boeing Aerospace

Colonel LamonB, TRADOC/USAFAS Representative

Mr. C.R. Holt, Mitre Corp

Work Group III - Data Base Requirements

Members: Dr, Bryson, CDF,C - Group Leader Colonel (Ret) Dupuy, TND Captain LawBon, DNA Mr. Cline, SPC

MrB. Shirley, Infantry School

Mr. Brown, Boeing Aerospace

Colonel Pokorny, TRADOC/USAFAS Representative

Dr. Leake, Armor A Eng Board

Mr. Loveless, USAFAS

Work Group IV - Suppression Modeling

Members: Dr. Payne - Croup Leader Colonel Reed, CAC Captain (P) Wallace, Fort Knox Dr. Dub in, AMSAA Mr. Cividan, ARI Mr. Weiss, Litton Dr. Blum, Vector Research

Colonel Slater, TRADOC/USAFAS Representative Mr Porrecn, R&D Associates Mr. Thorp, TRASANA Mr. Millepaugh, USAFAS

Itf-1

Work Group V - Suppression/Countersuppresslon Combat and Training Developments.

Members: Mr. Murphy, SAI - Group Leader Major Graham, Infantry School Major Money, Fort Rucker Captain Gunderson, AMSAA Lieutenant Colonel Bacon, TSM Smoke Colonel Quinlan, TRADOC/USAFAS Representative Major Johnston, Fort Bliss Major Kalla, AMSAA

SECTION V: SECOND AND THIRD SESSION-WORK GROUPS' RESULTS

A.	Group I:	Suppression Variables (Effects)
B.	Group II:	Suppression Variables (Causes)
C.	Group III:	Data Bass Requirements	•
D.	Group IV:	Suppression Modeling
E.	Group V:	Suppression/Countersuppression Combat and Training

Developments

5

A. Croup I: Suppression Variables (Effects)

Members: Mr. Goldberg - Group Leader

Dr. Banderet, USA Inst Environ Medicine

Mr. Downs, BRL

Mr. Giordano, HEL

Mr. Kunselman, AMSAA

Mr. Bauman, Fort Knox

Dr. Plotkin, Mitre Corp

Colonel Buel, TRADOC/USAFAS Representative Dr. Hegge, Walter Reed Dr. Chambers, ARI

In order to focus its effort Group I had the following goals and questlons/leeues :

1. Coale:

a. Identify significant variables

b. Prioritize their importance

2. Queations/IsBueB :

a. What unlt/indivldual functions are suppressed?

b. What is the extent (quantity, time length) of suppression?

c. What are the aggregate effects of suppression on weapon eyatem/unit?

d. How does unit/individual "battle history" affect suppression vulnerabilities?

The Croup I Report

Suppression is something like Mnrk Twain's view of the Washington weather "Everyone talks about it, but no one does anything about it".

Air conditioning may have helped to alleviate the Washington problem. Al¬ though there are some piecemeal efforts on suppression of dismounted troops, the Army has yet to develop an overall view and hence an overall program on what suppression is, what ceuaes it, and what its effects are.

. First a brief account of what haB been done -

- In connection with Army Small Arms Requirements effort and the ASARS Battle model developed to support It, data was gathered from Vietnam veterans about the results of suppression. These were consolidated into seven categories of increasing severity, based on the results of suppression on an individual's ability to move, shoot and observe. A CDEC experiment was Chen conducted in which small arms of various calibers were fired overhead and to the side of individual aoldiars - all combat veterans. These individuals ralatad tha round and distance to one of the seven categories. The Infantry School at tha seme time through a large scale questionnaire and a Delphi eval¬ uation tachnlque, quantified the amount of degradation of individual performance. It was now possible to relate quantitatively the performance of a particular round of small arms ammunition to its suppressive effect. These quantities have bssn Incorporated into tha ASARS Battle model and are presently being used in the SAW COEA.

Litton Corporation, under contract developed subjectively another model to quantify tha suppression effects of exploding munitions, principally artil¬ lery rounds, against dismounted troops. While the model is still being used,

It hai not been well accepted. In order to develop better data, CDEC has conduced two experiments, SUFEX II AND SUPEX III to quantify this suppression effect. Much progress has been made, but adequate realism does not yet appear to have been achieved, and the results of thesu two experiments have not been specifically approved by HQ TRADOC. The techniques which they have developed may eventually permit the solution of this problem.

. Whet Is not available.

- No completely accepted results on effects of exploding artillery munitions on dismounted troops.

- No suppression data for exploding small arms (BUSHMASTER) .

- No data on suppressive effects of any types of munitions on mounted

mo red forces.

- No date on suppression effects of any type of munitions on aircraft.

- No data on suppression effects of large caliber direct fire non-

exploding munitions.

If suppression is to be properly evaluated in the assessment of Army

V-A-2

,-jiH — . . '

. .it. J. J -

VJ’ mV. t

forces and systems, a comprehensive program leading to development of necessary data should be established. Recognizing the significance of the gap, the initial program could well be quite aggregated and subjective. A progressive refinement of quantitative information would then occur, with those areas deemed to have the highest priority receiving the earliest attention and greatest stress. The remaining portion of this discussion outlines how such a program might be established and Implemented.

- At figure 1 are a act of parameters needed to initiate the program - in thla llluatratlon, functiona, distance from FEBA, other variables and degraea of auppreaaion. Tha parameters may be changed for the final program - these

are for llluatratlon only.

- Tha remainder of the program is based on developing and then filling in a aet of matrices which described tha suppressive affect on s particular system in each of the varied conditions of interest . Figure 2 shows such a matrix, baaed on the parameters identified in figure 1.

- Figure 3 shows the matrix filled out for one sot of parameter! -

in the case for 'the M60A3 tank attacking on a clear day, Tha effects of all types of fire - direct, indirect and a mix are shown. Since thla is the initial version of tha matrix, tha aubjectiva aggregated suppression affects shown in flgurs 1 ars used. Experimentation and research may be used to broaden tha categories (recall that there are 7 In ASARS) and to refine the amount of suppression suffered under each condition. It appreara that the moat serious effects from auppreaaion occur in the close-in battle: therefore of the areas on this masting this la tha one which should racalva primary attention with tha aim of batter quantifying tha effects of suppression, and in addition quantify tha amount of degradation in performance associated with a particular suppression affect.

As Indicated in note 7, In the assault suppression may be difficult to daacrlba or quantify, while it probably does not exist for tha defender.

- Figure 4 expands examination of the MA60A3 tank to a defenseive posture. Again tha close in battle appears to require the moat attention.

- A "library" of suppression effects for all systems, units, and functions of Interest In all significant environments should bs dsvelopad in similar fashion. Figure 3 gives an llluatratlon of tha "books" in tha "library". Over time thla library ahould be extensive enough to permit consideration of suppression in all analysis. The library would include tha following steps:

- Development of each "book" baBed on available data plus subjective evaluation.

- Conduct of research and experimentation to batter quantify and refine each "book".

- Incorporation of the new data into the appropriate "book".

- Figure aix shows the conclusion of Work Group I. It indicated the direction to be taken in development of a suppression program.

V-A-3

WORK GROUP X - SUPPRESSION VARIABLES (EFFECTS)

- Following shows Che units on individual functions which will bs consider sd:

A. Command and control.

B. Target acquisition.

C . Movement .

D. Firepower.

- Battlefield is divided into three bands based on distance from FEBA, as follows:

Long Range Battle - 2000 to 3000 4- maters.

Close-in Battle - 2000 to 500 meters,

Assault - 500m to FEBA.

- Each weapon system/unlc/or variable will have its own suppression factors. Examples of variables;

- type weapon or vehicles

- weather

- terrain

- formation

- length of suppression

- Degree of suppression is as follows:

X not applicable.

O no effect.

-1 slight affect.

-2 great effect,

Figure 1,

V-A-4

SUPPRESSION EFFECT LEVELS

WEATHER:

CLEAR DAY

M60A3 TANK CO ATTACKER

Indirect Dirac t _ _ Mix

Long Range Battle - 3000+ to 2000M	1 -2A, -IB, -1C, XD (buttoned up) FASCAM 0A, -IB, -2C,XD	2 ATGM,-0A,0B, -1C.XD Tank X	3 General Degradation -2A,-2B,-2C,XD Synergistic effect exist but not acct for
Close in Battle 2000M to 500M	4 -2A,-1B,-1C, —ID (buttoned up) FASCAM -1A, -1B.-2C.-ID	5 ATOM- 1A, -IB, -1C, -ID Tanka 0A,0B, -1C,0D	6 -2A,-2B,-2C,-2D Synergistic effect exist but not accounted for
	6 0A,0B,0C,0D	6 0A,0B,0C,0D	6 0A,0B,0C,0D

NOTES:

1. Minimum kllla of attackar except for FASCAM.

2. Soma casualties to attackar.

3. A significant number of attackers killed considering range.

4. Increasing casualties.

3. Many casualties, but unit Is now willing to take some risks to accomplish mission.

6. Heavy casualties.

7. While an attacking unit in the assault may not be "suppressed" as discussed in other areas an attacking unit which is "stopped" or "pinned down" may be considered to be suppressed. ThiB condition is usually the result of direct fire.

CAPACITY TO BE VOLUNTARILY OR INVOLUNTARILY SUPPRESSED

Figure'' 3.

D.8. HEAVY MAINT RAIN

Ml 09 BRTY HEAVY FOG _

M60A3 CO

OLE | -

DEP| M60A3 CO

CLEAR DAY ATTACK

CONCLUSIONS

1. A matrix of eystems/unita vs. stimuli of significance to combat should be developed.

2. Each call in the matrix should be expanded into a library of suppression effects on system/unit functions.

3. Research! test and experiments should be stressed as a program to develop the quantitative inputs needed by each "book" in the library.

4. Emphasis should be placed on protected systems. Suppression cf these systems does not seem to have been adequately addressed.

5. For dismounted elements! increased attention should be placed on rear area combat support and combat service support units.

6. Although suppression la assessed on individuals, the cumulative effect of suppression of individuals may be a degradation of unit performance which is synergistic.

7. Duration of suppression must be determined on a unit/individual basis - continued suppression may permanently degrade Individual, and, therefore, unit effectiveness.

8. The conditions existing on the assault phaso of combat pressnt different problems snd may make suppression of leas significance than other phases.

9. Training, manning, and redundancy era essential to reduce the impact of suppression on unit performance,

10. In asaeesing unit/individual suppression effects, attention must be given to differences in physical vulnerabilities of craw members, e.g., M109 Chief of Section inside Howitzer vs. Ammo Handler dismounted. (Relate interaction this factor w/conclusion #6.)

Figure 6.

B. Group II: Suppression Variables (Causes)

Members: Mr. Hardison - Group Leader Colonel Crawford, TSM Smoke

Lieutenant Colonel Stokes, USA Inst Environ Medicine

Or. Burleson, TRASANA

Mr. Garrett, AMSAA

Mr. Landry, SPC

Mr. Lynch, Boeing Aerospace

Colonel Lemons, TRADOC/USAFAS Representative

Mr. C. R. Holt, Mitre Corp

In order to focus Its effort Group II had the following goals and questions /Issues :

1. Goals:

a. Identify significant variables

b. Prioritise their Importance

2.

Quest ions/ IssueB :

a. Whet are the critical parameters/slgnatures? (Rate of flre/volume of fire/weight of ordnance/blast/spaclal variables)

b. What is the suppressive effect of smoke/dust?

c. What are psychological factors?

d. What are physical factors?

c. What are the critical thresholds to trigger suppression?

THE GROUP II REPORT

I ?'

I f

J.

/

SLIDE 01

SUMMARY

- OUR THINKING FUZZY

- BUT HE ARE THINKING

- WITHIN & BEYOND CHARTER

- PROBABLY REDUNDANT TO OTHERS IN PART

- WE'RE NOT CONVINCED THAT NOTHING CAN BE DONE

- OUR PARTIALLY FORMED IDEAS ARE SHAREABLE.

SLIDE n

WORKING GROUP 2 CONVENTION

SLIDK it 3

PLAINS WHICH WE SUSPECT TO BE IMPORTANT

- SPACIAL - PROXIMITY OF EFFECT TO SUPPRESSEE

- TEMPORAL - NR. OF EFFECTS PER UNIT, TIME DURATION

- MAGNITUDE - SIZE OF THE STIMULI

- EXPERIENCE - HISTORY OF THE SUPPRESSEE

- BEHAVIOR OPTIONS - SHORT TERM RISKS & LONGER TERM RISKS

- PERCEPTION OF WELL-BEINC, AND IT'S DIRECTION OF CHANGE RATE. (S.S.S.)

SLIDE H

SOME FIRE-INDUCED CAUSES OF SUPPRESSION

LOUD NOISES/BRIGHT FLASHES	— >	INVOLUNTARY REFLEX
BLAST OVERPRFSSURE/ SEISMIC SHOCKS	>	BODY DISPLACEMENTS
SMOKE/DUST	— >	REDUCE VISION
THERMAL ENERGY /SHELL FRAG	-- >	CONCERN FOR LIFE
DEBRIS, EJECTA	>	MINOR WOUNDS

CHANGE THINGS, PEOPLE, ENVIRONMENT, ACTIONS

v-b-3

Mil

SLIDE «5

THE CHAIN

ROOT j fftv CAUSES ^

PHYSICAL

MUNITIONS

INTERMEDIATE

EFFECTS

FINAL

EFFECTS

PHYSICAL CHANGED PERFORMANCE

INVOLUNTARY REFLEX . OF

"LOCALLY RATIONED" 777)\ MAN/MACHINE DYSFUNCTIONAL SYSTEM

BEHAVIOR

SLIDE H

OUR FAITH IS THAT

- SEVERAL OF THE PRINCIPLE ROOT CAUSES OF SUPPRESSION:

_ ARE OF A PHYSICAL NATURE

_ CAN BE IDENTIFIED AND MEASURED

_ PRODUCE PREDICTABLE/REPRODUCIBLE EFFECTS WHICH

ALTER WHAT ELEMENTS OF FORCES - CAN DO

- DO DO

- A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE ABOVE, EVEN IF NOT ALL INCLUSIVE, WOULD BE A STEF IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

v-a-4

» ■ mwuHmMmwumk* n

. 1iTf - . . *

SLIDE il7

SI, IDE ffi

CAN CONTROL BE SUPPRESSED?

ACQ INFO RE TERRAIN WY, EN OP RAT , ENSIT, FRIENDSIT

YES

COMMAND

COMMO

ORGANIZATION

DOCTRINE

TRAINING

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

V— is— 5

SLIDE #9

CAN MANEUVER BE SUPPRESSED?

CAUSE UNWANTED MOVES YES

(SEEK COVER)

DISSUADE WANTED MOVES YES

CHANGE ROUTES & RATES YES

SLIDE #10

CAN FIRE BE SUPPRESSED?

DIRECT & INDIRECT	YES
POINT & AREA	YES
S-A i S-S	YES
UNARMORED &	YES
ARMORED	LESS YES
HOWITZERS VS	(NEEDS THOUGHT)

SLIDE 011

SO WHY NOT?

SINCE THE OPNL CONCEPT REQUIRES USE INDIRECT FIRES

- CONTROL	- TO	SUPPRESS	CONTROL
- FIRE	- TO	SUPPRESS	FIRE
- MOVE	- TO	SUPPRESS	MOVEMENT
- SPT	- TO	SUPPRESS	SPT

NOTION; USE FIRES TO COUNTER ENEMIES ABILITIES TO ACCOMPLISH THE SEVERAL FUNCTIONS, NOT JUST VS MAN UNITS & FS El, MTS.

SLIDE 012

A THOUGHT FRAMEWORK

- F

CONTROL I

FIRE

MOVE

SUPPORT

£ O > U

SLIDE #13

SLIDE #14

_ WE INTUIT THAT _

- WERE OTHER THINGS ABOUT EQUAL, WE WOULD USUALLY PREFER ATTRITION TO MERE SUPPRESSION, BECAUSE ATTRITION IS MORE LASTING

“ HOWEVER IT SOMETIMES MAY BE FAR MORE POSSIBLE AND LESS EXPENSIVE TO SUPPRESS THAN TO KILL

- MOREOVER. THOUGH LESS FINAL THAN ATTRITION, SUPPRESSION WILL OCCUR

AND IT STILL MAY CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO OUTCOMES OF COMBINED ARMS & SPT OPNS - SO A GOOD BARGAIN AT THE PRICE (CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES)

- CONCLUSION t WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND SUPPRESSION

V-E-8

SLIDE />15

IN OUR VIEWS

- SUPPRESSION

CAUSES

ENEMY ACTIONS

- DISSUADE )

- DISRUPTS )

- DEGRADES )

- PRECLUDES )

- SUPPRESSION EFFECTS TEND TO DECAY OVER TIME BUT ARE

RENEWABLE

SLIDE //16

INDIRECT FIRES PRODUCE

- ATTRITION - CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF ELEMENTS WHICH

CONTINU: TO EXIST IN A FORCE

— AND—

- SUPPRESSION - CHANGES WHAT THE ELEMENTS OF A FORCE:

- CAN DO

- DO

- (IMPORTANT TO KEEP GOOD BOOK ON BOTH)

(MAXIMIZE BENEFIT OF FIRES, CONSIDERING BOTH)

V-n-9

SLIDE 017

_ A RANDOM THOUGHT _

FACT: ARMY SYSTEMS ARE EMBEDDED - e.g. SUB-ITEMS IN ITEMS IN UNITS IN ORGANIZATIONS IN FORCES.

RESULTS: SUPPRESSION OF A SYSTEM OCCURS WHEN A NEXT LOWER

SYSTEM IS A CASUALTY; CASUALTY OF A SYSTEM PRODUCES SUPPRESSION OF THE NEXT HIGHER SYSTEM

SLIDE 018

FINALLY

- IT'S ALL MERELY "TERMINAL BALLISTICS"

- WHEN THERE WAS AN ORDNANCE CORP, THERE WERE PEOPLE WHO KNEW OR WERE LEARNING. THESE THINGS

- BUT NOW .

AD HOC WON'T HACK IT

V-B-10

C. Group III: Data Base Requirements

Members: Dr. Bryson, CDEC - Group Leader Colonel (Ret) Dupuy, TND Captain Lawson, DNA Mr. Cline, SPC

Mrs. Shirley, Infantry School

Mr. Brown, Boeing Aerospace

Colonel Pokorny, TRADOC/USAFAS Representative

Dr. Leake, Armor & Eng Board

Mr. Loveless, USAFAS

In order to focus its effort Group III had the following goals and questlons/issues :

1. Goals:

a. Data source list

b. Priority of required testing

c. Recommended experimental approach

s. Questions/Issues:

a. What data is available?

b. What are other likely sources?

c. What data gaps remain?

d. What experimentation /tea ting is needed?

e. How should the experiments be designed?

V-C-l

THE WORK GROUP III REPORT

1. What sources of data are available?

There are two prime sources of data available. They are ; 1) historical;

and 2) experimental.

1) A prime source of historical data is British or Operations Research in Northwest Europe. A team with the 21st Artillery Group accumulated much data on bombarding German troopa in NW Europe. SLA Marshall held post¬ combat interviews with soldiers in order to get a handle on suppression.

2) For experimental data CDEC has data from the following tests on suppressiont DUCS, DACTS, SAGE. SUPEX and SUPEX III. The USAARENBD has data from the Tank Company Night Fight Team and TTS OT II. It will also provide additional data from the Crewman's Vehicle Reference Header Test which will occur in the November 1979 timeframe. HEL also has data on the effect of noise on the ability of a gunner to track a target. Dollord & Miller's, Personality Theory. McGraw-Hill gives a psychological understanding of fear in terms of the gradient of avoidance and provides other references.

The results of the experimental data provide insights into the ability of the suppresses to shoot, move, communicate and acquire targets.

What needs to be done is to connect the experimental darn to the historical data which is a much greater and ample source.

2. What are other likely sources?

There is a wealth of historical data that naeds to be sorted and organised.

There is also a possibility of additional experiments being conducted to establish the relevance of this data as well as to fill any gaps that presently exist.

Some of the sources or other likely sources are;

1) Questionnaires; 2) interviews; 3) police reports; A) FAA pilot reaction in time and 3) psychological studies of animals under extreme stress.

3. In considering factors affecting suppression (see attached list), it seemed that three nearly independent, somewhat exhaustive factors were;

1) Type/mlsslon of suppressed unit

2) Immediate relationship of suppressed unit to snemy elements

3) Perceived lethality of suppressive fire

V-C-2

Taken in reverse order, data gaps and experimentation needs are nn follows: PERCEIVED LETHALITY:

- most date currently available

- need duration of suppression data IMMEDIATE THREAT

- need data on behavior of suppresses under constant stimulus as a function of immediate threat of his targets

TYPE UNIT

- need data on differential behavior as a function of whether unit is

— indirect fire unit — armor unit — diamounted infantry —mounted infantry — other unit

4. Given that a unit la suppressed P(%), what is the degradation of ite ability to _ _ (aa a function of time)?

- The most important activity to complete the sentence Is "shoot"

“ Except for the interdiction mission, the activities of move, communicate, and acquire targets are secondary

- Experlmanta are needed to answer this question

i

i

i

i

i

i

I

i

i

i

NOTE: It proved ueaful to the group to think In terms of tho following desired reeulta for degrading the enemy force:

1) Damage or disrupt systems

2) Impact on Human Factors 1) Change the Environment

Fire suppression addresses the second item,

V-C-3

FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPRESSION

I. WEAPONS FIRE CHARACTERISTICS!

Volume of Fire Per Unit Time Cyclic Rate Pet' Burst Duration of Fire Acoustic Signature Acoustic Tone Accuracy of Firs

Percsivad Lethality of Projectiles

Distance of Passing or Impacting Projectiles from the Soldier Manner of Distribution1 of Fire

Coordination of Firs with Suppressive Fire from Other Types of Weapons Weapon's Basic Load Visual Cuea

Uniqueness of Sound (e.g., ability of enemy to consistently Identify the sound with a particular weapon)

Actual Lethality of Projectiles

Signature Cues at the Weapon (e.g., muzzle blast)

In Flight Visibility of Projectiles (e.g,, tracer)

Impact Signature (e.g,, debris or dust thrown up by impacting rounds)

Time to Reload

Reliability

Fusing

V-C-4

Primary Determinants:

Proximity of Incoming Rounds to the Individual Loudness of the Projectile Signature Volume of Incoming Rounds to the Individual . Type of Weapons Systems Employed Against the Individual Unique Projectile or Weapons System Signature

Visual and Auditory Signature Associated with Impact of the Projectile

III. OTHER FACTORS

Experience Under Fire Leadership of the Unit Fatigue/Stress

Environmental Factors (climate, weather, terrain, night OPS)

Hunger Training Doctrine Posture Task Loading Unit Morale

Level of Unit Casualties Availability of Cover and Concealment Distance from Enemy

Croup Dynamics (e.g., social stimuli of other soldiers, NCOs, officers) Religious values Mission type

Proximity to Other Unit Members, Commander, Automatic Weapons Awareness of Enemy Fires

V-C-5

\

, 'W-fUL ' i* i l< ' J - AAlfcW^ILitk-1

SLIDE m

QUESTION

WHAT IS IT THAT I DO MOT KNOW, THAT I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW, THAT I CAN FIND OUT FROM:

- ANALYSIS?

- HISTORICAL SOURCES?

- EXPERIMENTATION?

SLIDE #2

TO DEGRADE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN ENEMY FORCE, ONE CAN:

- DAMAGE OR DISRUPT SYSTEMS

- CHANGE ENVIRONMENT

- OTHERWISE ALTER HUMAN BEHAVIOR

V-C-6

SLIDE 03

FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPRESSION

1. TYPE OF UNIT /MISSION OF UNIT

2. PROXIMITY OF ENEMY

3. PERCEIVED LETHALITY

SLIDE 04

HOW DO WE ALLOCATE FIRE

SLIDE #5

GIVEN THAT A UNIT IS SUPPRESSED PI, WHAT IS THE DEGRADATION OF THAT UNIT'S ABILITY TOs

- SHOOT

- COMMUNICATE

- MOVE

- ACQUIRE TARGETS AS A FUNCTION OF TIME?

SLIDE #6

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WHICH MAY BE ANSWERED BY HISTORICAL OR EXPERIMENTAL DATA

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF SUPPRESSIVE FIRE REQUIRED TO FORCES

A TANX CREW TO BUTTON-UP?

AN ARTILLERY BATTERY TO CEASE FIRE?

AN AD UNIT TO CEASE FIRE?

AN INFANTRY UNIT TO CEASE FIRE?

AN INTERRUPTION OF TARGET ACQUISITION?

AN INTERRUPTION OF COMMUNICATION?

AN INTERRUPTION OF LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES?

V-C-8

slide in

SUMMARY OF ADDITIONAL DATA NEEDED

DURATION OF SUPPRESSION UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS

FOR FIXED PERCEIVED LETHALITY, PROBABILITY AND DURATION OF SUPPRESSION AS A FUNCTION OF:

- ^ TYPE UNIT

- MISSION

- > PROXIMITY OF ENEMY

V-C-9

0. Group IV: Suppression Modeling

Members: Dr. Payne - Group Leader Colonel Reed, CAC Captain (P) Wallace, Port Knox Dr. Dubln , AMSAA Mr. Glvldan, ARI Mr. Weiss, Litton Dr. Blum, Vector Research Colonel Slater, TRADOC/USAFAS Representative Mr. Porreca, R&D Associates Mr. Thorp, TRASANA Mr. Mlllspaugh, U SAFAS

In order to focus Its effort Group IV had the following goals and questions/issues :

1 . Goals :

a. Agreement /consensus on the current modeling

b. Agreement on approaches for Improvement

2, Questlons/Isaues:

a. Review current /past methodologies.

b. Review vhat development is on-going.

c. What are the gaps?

d. What approaches are the best now and in the future?

3, Because of the diversity of the manner In which the work of Group IV was recorded, and In order not to Inadvertently edit out significant Information, the report of Group IV will be presented in four parts:

a. First day summary

b. Dialogue on the second day

c. Summary presented to Sympoalun participants

d. Chairman's Post - Symposium Summary

V-D-l

The Work Group IV Report; Part a

1. Introduction by Dr. Payne concluded that if we liad reports from Croupe I and II, modeling would then be a simple process.

2. Our current models have sufficient mathematical flexibility to represent the small body of data available to us now.

3. Discussion on definitions resulted in essentially the same definition that was presented in the opening meeting.

4. Discussion on types of models, a. Models for process control.

Should we create model for this and do we need to determine tactics or weapons design? Consensus was that we do not want a process control model.

5. Discussion concerning characteristics of current models which evolved into discussion of various tactics. Group concluded that suppression effects are scenario dependent.

6. Discussion of perceived threat/danger versus perceived benefit of action e.g. volume of fire makes a big difference and casualties in vicinity spur individual to move. Models that account for effects are efficient because ws srs not apt to obtain additional data.

Example: We can describe

Flinching

Interfering

Inhibiting

Neutralizing >

Due to equipment choices

position choices

time choices

target choices reorganization choices

and in anticipation of subsequent action

7. Physical posture of elements in target area affect detection, degrade P and Pj£ and inhibit ability to shoot or move.

V-D-2

H

1.3.

i.Lu "e m

aL.u'^i !i * ■ ■- 1 * • ■>» ■ *i r »i k hri

. *1 j acSSfflKa

Alto - suppressing 100X of unit for 50X of the tlms Is sntirsly different from suppressing 50X of the unit for 100X of the tints. Models do not always mske the distinction.

8. The discussions of the foregoing topics renged widely end meny diverse opinions were voiced. However , the group gsnerslly agreed on the following :

a. Suppression la certainly important enough to be modeled.

b. Suppressive effects may ba as important as lethal effects.

c. Suppression is caused by a wide diversity of variables and is difficult to model explicitly.

d. Generally that which has a greater potential to kill has greater potential to suppress, with two notable historical exceptions, white phosphorus and the "Headlight" round for WW11 bombers.

s. Artillery bombardment almost completely eliminates return fire by Infantry from the beaten tone.

f. Artillery will probably cause tanks to button up and move out.

The Work Group IV Report: Part b

On the morning of the second day (third session) a portion of the dlaeueelon wee recorded in writing; and, simultaneously, the names of the primary participants were given. Their names appear below followed by the dialogue:

1.	GEN	(Ret) William Depuy
2.	Dr.	Robert Blum
3.	Dr.	Henry Dubin
4.	Dr.	Wilbur Payne
5.	COL	Robert Reed
6.	Mr.	Keith Thorp

V-U-4

1

Dialogue

Depuy: Historical perapectiva on suppression. US failure to grapple with the real problem - that la gattlng fire on the target when the ground attach begins. When the suppression Is needed mat - all fire ceases. This Is one thing modeling does not address sufficiently. At Monts Casino the Germans had 3-5 min after British prap ended to get into

i

position.

Payne: Models have the capability. The problem exists with the tsctlcal approach taken by the player a/programs.

Perhaps we need to deal with activities and consequences of activi¬ ties dealing with exploitation of suppression.

Depuy: The Carmans prepped with small amounts of artillery , then heavy weapon direct fire, and finally with small arms - suppression. US approach was heavy artillery - lull - then attack (large groups of targets). Israelles will not attack with their tanks until they have destroyed all visual enemy tanks or suppressed or driven them off. Can models reflect that?

Payne: Yea — it depends on tha scenario presented by armor typas. One of the problems is modeling the time after suppression. The Russians' model lntlial go to ground time then all the rest is reorganisation time.

Depuy: Difference exists betvasn prepared position and hasty position reaction to suppression.

Depuy: Historical perspective on suppression. US failure to grapple with the rati problem - that Is getting fire on the target when the ground attack begins. When the suppression is needed most - all fire teases . This it one thing modeling does not address sufficiently. At Monte Casino the Germans had 3-5 min after British prep ended to get into position.

Payne: Models have the capability. The problem exists with the tactical approach taken by the players/ programs.

Perhaps we need to deal with activities and consequences of activi¬ ties dealing with exploitation of suppression.

Dapuy: The Carmans preppad with small amounts of artillery, then heavy weapon direct fire, and finally with small arms - suppression. US approach waa heavy artillery - lull - then attack (large groups of targets). Israelite will not attack with their tanks until they have destroyed all visual enemy tanka or suppressed or driven them off. Can models reflect that?

Payne: Yea — it depends on the scenario presented by srmor types. One of the problems is modeling the time after suppression. The Russians' model intilal go to ground time then ell the rest is reorganization time.

Depuy: Difference exists between prepared position and hasty position reaction to suppression.

V-D-6

Payne)

Dubln:

Payne:

Dapuy:

Payne:

Dubln;

Read)

Thorp:

Payna:

Thorp:

Payna:

Reed:

Payna:

Modela do handle thla although perhaps Incorrectly. Going beyond thia nay cauaa uaera to look too closely at details. The correla¬ tion axlats between lethality and auppresslvenese. It nay lead to problems to compensate for the variations to that rule.

What General Depuy may be telling us la that we do not address the tactics of suppression.

i

Again this is a function of the tacticians using the models.

Modela ahould also handle performance of crews.

People are not comfortable with projections of lees than outstanding performance. Any model is capable of doing this.

The biggest criticism in our last games is that there is too much attrition for rounds expended.

Models need to better address how much degradation resulta.

Models need to address continued suppression. Tlmss/Amount Anno. 8ome models do that (ASSARS, etc.)

Is allowing .hat capability worthwhile?

Transition states arc Infrequent.

General Dupuy may be looking for a process control model to explore tectlcs.

Every means of enhancing suppressive effects, degrades lethal

V-D-7

effects. Suggest two level board to review proposals - one to review tffsets, one to decide If It Is cost effective. Models can't answer that question.

Payne: Almost any round will produce flinch. Bigger rounds produce longer effects. Models don't represent neutralization (from long duration, saturation explosives).

Reed: Whet about Nukes! Delays casualties, unit dissolution, suppression

on grand scale.

Dubln: Chemical weapons also?

Reed; Psycho/Phyelo effects - heat Injury?

Peyna: We have difficulty Isolating suppression. Different resultB from proving ground end combat involve many factors. May be double- dipping In trying to solve this problem.

Dubin: Greet deal of bureaucratic pressure to reduce rate of attrition, end speed. Suppression Is a straw we are grasping for.

Payne: Will use suppression to label effects which we cannot effectively

factor. Our models ere throughput models - if you put It in at one and, they come out et the other.

Blum: Models do not Include conditioning variables.

Peyne: 1 feel it ie better with the current system. Player inputs behavior.

Blum: Agree.

V-D-8

Ues as a surrogate to conditioning variables (state variables).

The Inputs of the players.

Conditioning Variables for Suppression:

1 . Backgrounds

a. Audio

b. Visual

c. Duration

2. Command and Control Function

3. Conditioning variables for aggregated models.

Payne: We have not ansvered the question raised by Dr. Dubln with regard to model pace VS battle pace.

SUMMARY - This session was spent discussing the need for suppression modeling, problems Involved and capabilities of existing models to In¬ corporate both differing tactics and euppreaalve effects.

The military needs for suppression were provided in large part by General (Rat) Depuy through discussion of WWII experience and Zaraall use of suppressive end lethal fire prior to armored attacks. His questions to the group were primarily of the model's capabilities to examine these tactics and effects.

Answers to his questions were given primarily by Dr. Payne who stated that Depuy' s desires could be met with existing models by proper use of tactical decisions and salectlon of scenarios to be played.

Most of the problems surfaced during this session dealt with difficulty in obtaining data and the degree of detail that should be In¬ corporated into the models.

V-D-9

A driving problem from AMSAA's viewpoint is the need to provide effects lntemel to the models that reduce rate of attrition and speed of the battle. It is their experience that almost all games progress at speeds end attrition rates much higher than real life based on history.

Questions were posed regarding the inclusion of suppression in models of nuclear games such as DIVWAG at Sandia Labs. No conclusions regarding this were reached.

The group adjourned at 1000 hours arriving at the same con¬ clusions reached the previous afternoon.

V-D-10

Slide #1

!

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

1. Review current/peet methodologies.

2. Review whet development le ongoing.

3. Whet ere the geps?

4. Whet epproeehea ere the beat now end In the future?

Slide 12

MODEL TYPES

1. Modela that account for effecte.

2. Model! for procese control: e. Tactlca * b. Weapon dealgn

MODELING APPROACHES

1. Hypothesise a particular action in reaponae to riek, predict effect on perf onrance .

2. Predict affect on performance with no apecif lcatlon of action.

Slide #3

CURRENT/PAST METHODOLOGIES

- Alnoat all are attempts to account for effecte, predict performance without apecif ylng action.

- Can build and occasionally use modal approach 2.

V-D-ll

l

I

Slide U

WORKING CROUP 2	CONVENTION
! S	| NOT THIS

ATTRITION

S' ^ CASUALTIES

A N

SUPPRESSION

SUPPRfi	SJ^ION
[CASUAL-\	A
HIES /	PERF ,
\Ay	J

IN THE SMALL	Slide 15	IN THE LARGE
Flinching		Equipment choices
Interfering		Positioning choices
Inhibiting		Time choices
Neutralising		Target choices
Due to -		Reorganization choices
	V-D-12	in anticipation of -

The Work Group IV Report: Part d

SUPPRESSION MODELING

Summary of Discussion in Working Group IV

1. The initial discussion centered on fundamentally different types of models. That is models that differ in purpose or in the type of problem to be investigated. In the terms used by the working group these were described as Models for Process Control and Models for Representing Suppressive Effects*

a. Models for Process Control.

(1) This term was used to describe models that might be used either for weapon system design trade-off purposes or perhaps for qualitative re¬ quirements purposes.

(2) For example, it is possible that specific design fsaturea of weapons or munitions could enhance their suppressive effect. If there were reseon to believe this and if such features could be added with neither penalty in the lethal affects or added cost, there would, of course, be no need for either model or analysis. However, the perversity of nature makes it almost certain that, even if we knew how to design weapons with assurance that their suppressive effect would be enhanced, we would face tradeoffs of lethal ef facte or incraaeas in cost.

(3) There is some evidence in or on the fringes of history that suggest that suppressive effects may not be directly and tightly

V-D-13

coupled with lethal effect. Further, there are some suggestions that weapons with a high suppressive potential might yield greater benefit In some uses than more lethal weapons with lower suppression potential.

(a) Cases of this that were cited as probable evidence from history Included the steady Increase In the use of White Phosphorous In final protective fire during WW II. This has generally been ex¬ plained In terms of the suppreslve benefits of the smoke and of an

i

apparently deep seated fear of burning. The Headlight round (a .50 caliber round used In B-17's that was modified so the tracer was highly visible to the target) was also discussed. It was noted that some people attribute the universal trend toward automatic rifles as an example. There Is some reason to believe that automatic rifles will In fact and predictably produce fewer casualties than aimed fire from semiautomatic rifles. But there Is also some evidence that units armed with semiautomatic rifles are less likely to engage when faced with automatic fire.

(b) It Is clear In the literature that some people believe that mixes of bomblets and mines or of instant and delayed fuzed bomblets would have more total effect than would rounds that contain only Instant fuzes even though current models show these would have lower expected lethal effect than the same weight of Instant fuzed bomblets.

(4) In the end, perhaps because the composition of the group did not Include weapon design engineers, there was an apparent con¬ sensus that there was little Interest In models of process control.

V-D-14

Even those members Mho t.iought such models would be useful If available did not see a clear path to their development. That Is, neither further review of history nor feasible peacetime experiments are likely to produce a semi quantitative basis for relating particular design features to specific enhancements of suppressive effect.

(5) If these views are correct then a model that purported to be a process control model would, In the end, rest on assumptions that connect cause and effect, and would not be different from models de¬ signed solely to represent effects.

(6) If there Is management Interes. In this class of problems, they could be approached, In the absence of process control models, In

a more direct If judgmental manner. For example, a board could be created to review specific weapon design proposals. If this board judged the specific proposal would produce some enhanced suppressive effect a second board could explore and render judgment on whether the benefit achieved from this would outweigh the penalty In lethal effects or costs. If either board could hypothesize the suppression enhance-

I

ment In specific terms this could, of course, be Investigated In models designed to represent effects. As CG TRADOC, GEN OePuy Initiated the most recent round of renewed Interest In suppression through the SUPEX experiments. His discussion with the group Indicated his interest was to make sure that the effects of suppression were not ignored.

b. Models for Representing Effects.

(I) The group generally agreed that In addition to their potential to kill and damage, weapons do indeed have less direct effects embodied In the working definition of suppression. Further, these effects are generally too large to Ignore and in many cases may be asj or more Important In combat than the damage producing effects. Because of this and In spite of our limited historical or empirical knowledge, there was general agreement that the effects should not be ignored in models of combat.

(2) It was clear patUy from the briefings in the general session and partly from the knowledge of members of Working Group IV that the most detailed of the current family of combat models have an elaborate and flexible representation of suppressive effects. Even the analytical and rather abstract models can represent assumptions about suppressive effects. At the least, rates of target detection and of fire are explicit or Implicit Inputs to most models and these can be Judiciously chosen to represent whatever the user believes about suppression.

(3) The present models seem able to represent the suppressive effects of fire as these are described In both historical and empirical sources. They do not, however, usually represent all of the potential effects In their day-to-day use In various studies.

V-D-16

(a) Generally speaking, the current Monte Carlo models accumulate Information over time about the number and type of rounds landing In the vicinity of combat elements. If the element Is not killed by the fire the models then associate a change In posture and/ or of activity of the element as the suppressive effect. In particular an element may disappear as a direct fire target and may simultaneously have reduced capability both as a detector of targets and In firing on them.

(b) In most such models the different types of arriving rounds have different weights or suppression Indices. Similarly, to one degree or another, It Is generally true that the suppressive effect of close misses Is greater than more distant ones.

(4) These are not the only "suppressive" effects that are or can be represented In current models.

(a) The working definition of suppression proposed In the general session would Include the effects of smoke and dust In so far as they affect vision or coordination as "suppressive" effects. There Is a large experimental program covering at least the vision related effects of smoke and dust. The present models are rapidly changing

to exploit the results of this Investigation.

(b) The group hypothesized and named several different effects that might represent a subdivision of the broad phenomenon Into sub classes. These were classified Into two different categories.

V-D-17

i.—. i-flfct javw .

<ii. 4. JlL .LU.ii.':

I Actions taken as a result of receiving fire.

a Flinching. A term used to describe a largely Involuntary, Instantaneous reaction to the noise or flash of a round. Generally believed to be of short duration this can nevertheless Interfere with Immediate on going tasks such as aiming or controlling weapons. This Is not usually represented as a separate phenomenon In combat models.

b Inhibiting. A term used to describe a more or less con¬ scious and controlled action to reduce exposure to a risk from fire.

This term was used for actions such as taking cover or changing the state of movement. To varying degrees present models represent this.

c Neutralizing. This term was used to represent what appears as a very long term psychological effect of fire. The prin¬ cipal historical source for this Is the final report of Operational Research Section 2. But there are other historical examples that Indicate It is a real phenomenon. It Is not represented in current, small unit combat models. The volume-duration dimensions of fire that occurs In such models seldom, If ever, reaches the range in which this phenomenon seems to occur.

d Interfering. This term was used to represent effects where, Independent of psychological state, the effects of the fire would make It Impossible to continue or perform some task. This subset would then In¬ clude effects of smoke or dust. Current models do not usually Incorporate these effects In that part of the model called the "suppression" submodel.

V-D-18

2 Actions taken In anticipation of fire.

a It seemed worthwhile to note that even though these are not usually described as "suppressive" effects there are some Influences from the threat of fire that are at least Implicitly represented In current models. For example, the threat of fire Influences the choice of positions for elements In the scenario. It also Influences the

i

timing of certain events In the sense that a unit may be Instructed not to occupy some position until after the preparatory fire phase.

On a larger scale It can result In limits on resupply or support operations, for example, through a doctrine that permits supply operations only at night. It Is, at least partly, anticipation of fire that leads to some equipment choices such as the APC and SP artillery.

b These effects are represented both In the Input and output to present models. For example, to the extent certain otherwise desir¬ able fighting positions are not occupied, both casualty production and casualty acceptance are affected In current models.

2. A purist might note that the difference between the two types of model 1$ superficial. The principal sources of quantitative data for either class of models are the Final Report of ORS-2, a source that under' les early US and present UK models, some work by Litton using sources and data from Vietnam and the Series of SUPEX experiments at CDEC. As a general observation all of these Indicate (or at least do not conflict with the hypothesis) that, In the main, the suppressive effect of a given round at a given distance Is closely correlated with Its lethal potential. That Is, considering the Individual effects of

V-D-19

single rounds, a round with greater potential for casualty production also has greater suppressive potential. This may not be universally true and, as noted, there are some examples of probable exceptions. This relation between lethal and suppressive effect might be perfectly adequate as In present models to capture most of the effect of suppression. But so long as the exceptions remain unexplored and unexplained, it would be wrong to use the results of these for detailed weapon design purposes. It could be equally wrong, without Intervening judgment, to use the results of these models for choice of tactics.

3. Generally speaking, the working group had no specific suggestions

»

for modifying the basic structure of the best of the current combat model s.

a. In every area where there Is a modicum of data the models can and do use It.

b. In areas where there Is nearly complete absence of data the models can accept Judgmental Inputs. Among such areas, It can be noted that wide differences exist In the literature and In present models or In their application about the rate of recovery from the flinching and Inhibiting subclasses of suppression. Nor is It clear that present models distinguish between "flinching" and "Inhibiting" effects If, Indeed, there Is a difference. It can also be noted that wide differences exist about suppression effects on the crews of armored vehicles and artillery units. None of the three basic sources of data deal very directly with armored and

V-D-20

artillery units. It can be shown that the computed results from the present models depend as much on assumptions about the duration of suppression as they do on the probability that It occurs.

c. It might be possible to narrow these differences either by bureaucratic flat or by emerging consensus. But. In the main, It Is very clear that most differences In the modeling of suppression rest on a quite real difference of opinion about the effects. Since that difference exists It Is probably more useful to Insist that the particular treatment of suppression be a mandatory part of study reports than It would be to Impose a single standard approach to this problem.

E. Croup V: Supprasslon/Countersuppresslon Combat und Training Developments

Members : Mr. Murphy, SAI - Croup Leadar Major Graham, Infantry School Major Money, Fort Rucker Captain Gunderson, AMSAA Lieutenant Colonel Bacon, TSM Smoke Colonel Quinlan, TRADOC/USAFAS Representative Major Johnston, Fort Bliss Major Kalla, AMSAA

In order to focus its effort Group V had the following goals and questlone/laeuee i

1. Coale:

a. Prioritise on-going developments

b. Recommend high pay-off areas

2. Queetione/Issuee:

a. What combat activities are most easily suppressed?

b. What combat activities offer best pay-off for suppression?

c. How do we become less suppressible? (tactics, material, training)

d. How do we become better suppreBBors? (tactics, techniques, muni t lone, weapons)

V-E-l

The Croup V Report

DISCUSSION:

- Th« definition of suppraasion may be adequate but the group Is still examining what it mesne to 'suppress.' Suppression is ona of the things we do to defeat the enemy. In order of increasing severity we do the following disrupt, suppvess, neutralise, destroy.

- Emphasis should be placed on the training of our troops to make them harder to auppreas and to make them better suppressors, particularly in a chemical warfsre/smoke environment.

QUEST IOHS/ISSUBS i

What combat activities are most easily suppressed?

- exposed pereonnel

- soft equipment

- vulnerable equipment + lack of training - easily suppressed target What combat activities offer beat pay-off for suppression?

- focus on front line units/activities

- timeliness

- armor, observation, C&C, fire support, ADA How do we become less suppresslble?

- position/equipment hardening

- shoot aod scoot

- training/an understanding of deception

- laser considerations

How do we become better suppressors?

- better, more realistic training

- timeliness

- examine munition mixes, e.g., FASCAM 4 ICM

- training (combined arms, in degraded environment)

- BEAD: integrate efforts of USAF and Army air and ground assets

V-E-2

■ uiiiw.ij... . i. *■ •na.wnmaimias

GOALS;

Prioritize ongoing developments:

- GSRS . FASCAM*

- BUSHMASTER - IFV/CFV

- IMPROVED SMOKE* - DAD-C3

- FIREFINDER

* - Priority

- RPV

- TACFIRE/BCS

- ARP

- COPPERHEAD

- HELF1RE

- ARTY PIP'S*

- SINCGARS -OTHERS?

Recommended high pey-off areas - maneuver

- Fire Support

{

SUMMARY

"Suppression" requires definition end clerif lcetlon through measurement. The elms dimension is Important.

Training offers lcvsrsge In Improving our cspabillty to suppress and to become less suppressable.

Appropriate munitions mixes have not been determined, nor ere the Implications of smoke and other forms of observation available for consider¬ ation by combat developers.

The dimension of suppression should be considered along with lethality In prioritising hardware under combat development. While the priority may not change, the mix, doctrine, and tactics of systems will be Influenced whan this Is placed Into perspective. Emphasis should be on product Improvements for the currant time frame.

SECTION VI - ADDITIONAL MATERIAL

The articles in this section were submitted for consideration at the Fire Suppression Symposium, but only one article was submitted in a sufficient quantity to allow each participant to receive a copy; therefore, the seven articles are Inclosed here for future consideration in studying the suppressive effects of fires on the battlefield. The titles of the articles and the namea of their authors appear below.

Appendix A

Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D

Appendix E

Appendix F

Appendix G

A Further Look at the Prediction of Weapons Effectiveness in Suppressive Fire by Albert L. Kubala and William

L. Warnick (ARI)

Executive Summary of SUPEX TUB Final Report (USACDEC)

Indirect Fire Suppression Model by Phillip M. Allen (AMSAA)

Review and Evaluation of Current Suppression Models With Proposal for Interim Model by Phillip M. Allen (AMSAA)

Suppressive Effects of Artillery Fire by F.W. Niedenfuhr (MITRE Corporation for DARCOM)

Toward a Theory of Suppression by HERO Staff (Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, a subsidiary of T.N. Dupuy Associates)

Weapons Effectiveness and Suppressive Fire by George

M. Gividen (ARI)

ARI TECHNICAL REPORT TR-79-A19

A Further. Look at the Prediction of Weapons

Effectiveness in Suppressive Fire

by

Albert L. Kubala and William L. Warnick HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH ORGANIZATION 300 North Washington Street Alexandria, Virginia 22314

MAY 1979

Contract DAHC 1 9 -75 -C-0025

Monitored by

ARI Field Unit at Fort Hoot', Texas

Prepared far

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

fer tbe BEHAVIORAL eed SOCIAL SCIENCES

S001 Elseakewer Arenas

Alexandria, Virginia 22333

u. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

WILLIAM L, HAUSER

JOSEPH ZEIDNER Technical Director

Colonel, US Army Commander

Reiearch accompl lifted

under contract to tfte Department of the Army

Human Rtaourcea Reiearch Organization

N0TIC8S

DISTRIBUTION: Primary dlltrlbutlon of thu raport nil baan madt by ARI. Hum addraii eorrttpondanea oonoarnlnj dittWbutlo" of raporta to U. 8. Army Raaiarch Innuuta for tha Bthavioral and Social Seiancat, ATTN. reai-P, 8001 Biaanhowar Avanua, Almindrii, Virginia 22333

PINAL PltaQaiTlQN: Thl» raport miy bl dattroyad yyhan it ii no loogar naadad. Plum do not rityrn it to th* U. t. Army Riaaareh Initltuti for th* Blhivioril »nd loclil Scnneai.

NprH: The finding! in thu ripen • r» not to b« eonnruid il in offlclil Dapartmant of th* Army pontion. unlan M daaignatad by oth»r authoruad doaumanta.

I. nuBRK

ncruR i wwuncn i a i iun rAUE

BBFORE COMPLBTWO gOgjj

I RECIPIENT'! CATALOQ NUMBER

I. OOVT ACCESSION NO

TR-79-A14

4. TITLE rand SuAlttl*; I

A FURTHER LOOK AT THE PREDICTION OF WEAPONS EFFECTIVENESS IN SUPPRESSIVE FIRE T

7.

AUTHOR**}

r

TYRE OR REPORT A RERIOO COVERED

Technical Report

11 May 1977 - 11 May 1978

RERRORMINO ORO. RCRORT NUMBER

FR-WD-TX-78-4 contract or oAant HUMBER**)

Albert L. Kubala and William L. Warnick

DAHC 19-75-C-0025

I. RERRORMINO ORO AHI I ATIOR NAME AND ADOREIt

Human Resources Research Organization 300 North Washington Street Alexandria, Virginia 22314

n. CONTROLLINO ORRICE NAME ANO AOORBU

,0' ISISVSoV^SIVVu^WrV' ta,k

2Q763743A775

It. RBRORT DATE

HQ TCATA

Fort Hood, Texas 76544

1 4. moniToHin4 ioih'Sy nam! a addrei**i/ J/^r*ni mm c«ir*uri« owttj US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333

May 1979 _

II. NUMBER OR RAO El

42

IT security class. (•/ an* m»mo

Unclassified

TIT- ATr5M785lN'WXBrNa'

la. exifkieuTioN bTXTImInt *•* SSS KSfOi)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

17. OIITRieUTION St ATIMENT <•! St* (tiMil Ml *r*l In MUt* M, II If/teni i» h « ft*R*rt)

Tl. IURRL BNENT ART HOTEI

Monitored by Charles 0. Nystrom, ARI Field Unit at Fort Hood, Texas

II. REV WORD! fCmtinu* on *1S* If na«**tar R Ml IlMlIfy A y kloak mmkmt)

Suppression

Small Arms Effectiveness

It A SI TRACT rCMUMlII RRMTMRR «M j? mmiNf Ml IHMfllR Ay iiiii mw>Rj

This research and literature review investigated the relationship between acoustic signatures of small-arms projectiles and the suppressive behavior which reaults from soldiers' perceptions of danger. Kinetic endrgy, which is associated with perceived loudness of passing projectiles, appears to bo the primary physical property of projectiles that affects behavior under fire. The report la written for military personnel.

DO,ja2w 1473 edition or ♦ mov •» n obsolete Unclassified

security clash rication or mis rase *ihan bar* Kit**)

i

V

Army Project Number 20763743A775

Human Performance in Field Assessment Contract DAHC 19-75-C-0025

Technics! Report TR-79-A19

A FURTHER LOOK AT THE PREDICTION OP WEAPONS EFFECTIVENESS IN SUPPRESSIVE FIRE

Albert L. Kubals end William L. Warnick Human Resources Research Organisation

Submitted by:

George N. Gividen, Chief ARI FIELD UNIT AT FORT HOOD, TEXAS

May 1979

Approved by:

Frank J. Harris, Acting Director Organizations and Systems Research Laboratory

Joseph Zeidner, Technical Director U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

FOREWORD

The Fort Hood Field Unit of the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) provides support to Headquarters, TCATA (TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity; formerly called MASSTER— Modern Army Selected Systems Test Evaluation and Review). Thia support is provided by assessing human performance aspects in field evaluations of man/weapons systems.

A war using modern weapons systems is likely to be both Intense end short. US man/weapons systems must be effective enough, immediately, to offset greater numbers of an enemy. Cost-effective procurement of improved or new combat systems requires testing that Includes evaluation of the systems in operational settings similar to those in which the systems are Intended to be used, with troops representative of those who would be using the systems in combat. The doctrine, tactics, and train¬ ing packages associated with the systems being evaluated must themselves also be tested and refined as necessary.

This report presents the results of an investigation originally designed to determine what aspects of the auditory signatures of passing projectiles are perceived as making the projectiles dangerous, resulting in suppressed behaviors. The report presents a review of the relevant literature, and examines kinetic energy as the primary physical property of projectiles that affect behavior.

ARI rasearch in this area is conducted as an in-house effort, and as joint efforts with organizations possessing unique capabilities for human factors research. The research described in this report wee done by personnel of the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO), under contract DAHC19-75-C-0023, monitored by personnel from the ARI Fort Hood Field Unit. This research is responsive to the special re¬ quirements of TCATA and the objectives of RDTE Project 2Q763743A775, "Human Performance in Field Assessment," FY 1978 Work Program.

A FURTHER LOOK AT THE PREDICTION OF WEAPONS EFFECTIVENESS IN SUPPRESSIVE

FIRE

BRIEF

Requirement:

The work carried out In this study is that referred to In paragraph 2,2.23 of ths Statsnent of Work dated 16 May 1977 under the title of "Suppression Research." The objectives of this effort were:

• To provide a review of the literature published since 1970 on fire suppression by small arms.

* To determine from information available what aspects of the acoustic signatures of projectiles contribute to their being perceived as dangerous and result in suppressed behaviors.

Procedure :

A field study conducted in the early 1970b produced a psychological rating of "perceived dangerousness" of a series of small arms fire events. A behaviorally anchored Suppression Index (SI) was sIbo derived from a similar set of small arms fire events. It was concluded that the psychological scalss ware baaed almost solely on the subjects's reac¬ tions to ths noises of the passing projectiles. However, no data on the acoustic signatures of the projectiles were obtained at that time. This effort was initiated aB a literature review to determine whether data on acoustic signatures of the weapons employed were available, and if so, whether any aspect (e) of these signatures could be employed to "predict" the psychological scales. A review of the general literature on sup¬ pression was also conducted.

Principal Findings:

• Data on the acoustic signatures of projectiles down range from the weapon are extremely limited, and are not complete enough to be of any value in determining the relationship between signatures and the psychologically-derived Suppression Index and perceived daugerouaness ratings.

• Kinetic energy, which is believed to be closely related to the perceived loudness of passing projectiles, appears to account for nearly 100% of the variance between weapons on both the Suppression Index and the perceived dangerousness ratings.

• Further research is needed to validate the findings relative to kinetic energy, and to better establish the mathematical relationship between miss distance, rate of Fire, and psycho¬ logical scales such as the Suppression Index.

V I

Utilization of Finding*:

Operations research analysts in attempting to piay suppt«“ijn la combat models have had to rely on intuition and fragmentary description* of behavior under fire to develop their models. As a result, the I han dling of auppraesion haa been highly variable. The ®

analysis in thia research should provide them with another tool to help refine computer Models involving auppreaeion play.

vli

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PACE

1 Background . 1-1

2 Research Problem and Literature Review . 2-1

Discussion of the Literature . 2-5

Interview and questionnaire studies . 2-6

Experimental studies . 2-8

Models . 2-12

3 Analysis . . . . 3-1

4 Recap, ituation and Recommendations ... . 4-1

REFERENCES . R-l

FIGURES

?

■1

i

2- 1 Probability of suppression as a function of radial miss

distance . . . 2-10

3- 1 Perceived dangerousness as a function of kinetic energy

(adapted from Kushnick and Duffy) . . . 3-6

TA'ILES

2-1 Response Alternatives to Fire Events . 2-2

2-2 Suppression Scale Scores . . . 2-4

2-3 Relationship Between Kinetic Energy (KE) and Perceived

Dangerousness . . 2-4

2- 4 Most Feared United Nations Weapons. . 2-7

3- 1 Relationship Between Projectile Diameter, KE, and

Perceived Dangerousness . 3-5

3-2 Computed and Actual Perceived Uangerouaness Ratings Based on

Kinetic Energy. . . 3-8

Chapter 1 BACKGROUND

It has long been believed that most weapons, in addition to their casualty-producing capabilities, also have Incapacitating psychological effects which may inaccurately reflect the actual threat. Earlier works dealing with these psychological ef fecte^' ** ’•* 5 invoked the concept of

fear. Essentially, all of these efforts were directed toward finding out which weapons were most feared by the respondents. Subjects queried included American, British, German, North Korean, and Communist Chinese soldiers. While these works did demonstrate that fear of a weapon and Its casualty-producing capability were not perfectly correlated, only minimal Information was obtained on the reasons for the observed dis¬ crepancies. Furthermore, as Terry® pointed out, the data obtained were strictly ordinal In nature with the scales typically ranging from most feared to least feared. In addition, the effects on the actual behavior of the Individuals queried were not determined. In other words, it could not be determined whether these stated fears had any effect on the conduct or the outcome of a battle. Therefore, these earlier data ara useful only as an aid In the formulation of hypotheses.

One of the behavioral results expected from fear of enemy weapona Is the phenomenon called "suppression.'' The term suppression has long been a part of the Army's vocabulary. However, attempts to arrive at a precise definition have proven elusive.'7 Virtually all definitions of

3J. Dollard. Fear in Battle , The Institute of Human Relations,

Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, 1943.

O

H. Goldhamer, A. L. George, and E. W. Schnltzar. Studies of Prisoner-of-War Opinions on Weapons Effeotiveneaa (Korea) (U) , RM-733, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, December 1951.

j

L. A. Kahn. A Preliminary Investigation of Chinese and North Korean Soldier Reaotions to UN Weapons in the Korean War, ORO-T-14 (FEC) , Johns HopkinB University, 1952.

4l. A. Kahn. A Study of Ineffective Soldier Performanoe Under Fire in Korea, ORO-T-62 (AFFE) , Johns Hopkins University, 1954.

6S. A. Stouffer, et al. The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath , Vol II, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton, University Press, 1949.

s

R. A. Terry, Toward a Psychological Index of Weapons Effective¬ ness, Part I: Field Studies, Technical Report 1419-5, University of Oklahoma Research Institute, Norman, December 1964,

7

L. A. Huggins, Jr, "A Simplified Model for the Suppressive Effects of Small Arms Fire," MaBtera Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Cn I I Torn I , September 1971.

l-l

\

M

U

suppression attempt to relate the volume of fire of one force to a degradation of performance of the opposing force. Tor example, Winter and Clovis" define suppression as "...the causing of human reactions that reduce individuel (unit) efficiency to fire, observe, and move,"

A Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC) report^ states that the TRADOC definition is "the degradation of specified combat activity for a particular period of time." According to Kinney,^ "suppression ie e short-term transient degradation in the combat performance of infantryman. It is produced by their behavioral response to the le¬ thality potential (risk) of impacting weapons that do not incapacitate them." The Ad Hoc Group on Fire Suppression^ states that suppression Is:

...a process which causes temporary changes in performance capabilities of the suppressee from those expected when functioning in an environment which he knows to be passive. These changes are caused by signals from delivered fire or the threat of delivered fire, and they result from behaviors that are intended to lessen risk to the suppressee.

jj Numerous other definitions have been given in the literature, but all of

s' those located ware very similar to the preceding examples. All of the

definitions imply that suppression is temporary, i.e., it is not a jr result of physical incapacitation due to injury or death. They also

imply that some aspect of performance must be adversely affected before | a force or an individual can be said to be suppressed. The performances

f most frequently mentioned are those of observation, returning fire, and

k maneuvering. However, a broader view was taken by the Ad Hoc Group,

R. P. Winter and E. R. Clovis. Relatione hip of Supporting Weapon Systems Performance Charade notice to Suppression of Individuate and

Small Unite, TR 73/002, Defense Sciences Laboratories, Mellonics Systems Development Division, Litton Systems, Inc., Sunnyvale, California, January 1973.

g

Project Team II, US Army Combat Developments Experimentation Com¬ mand, and Braddock, Dunn, and McDonald Scientific Support Laboratory, Fort Old, California. Diapereion Against Concealed Targets (DACTS), USACDEC Experiment FC 023, Final Report, July 1975.

D. G. Kinney. Suppression Analysis Technique (U) , unclassified version of paper presented to 33 MORS, Weapons Planning Group, Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California, undated.

!■ 11

!> US Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

■ For Research, Development, and Acquisition, Washington, D.C. Report

f of the Amy Scientific Advisory Panel Ad Hoc Croup on Fire Suppression,

( ODCSRDA Form 11, 7 July 1975.

For example, they spoke of the suppression of command and control acti¬ vities through electronic warfare. Obviously, loss of communications la likely to degrade performance in other areas, especially maneuvering. However, most other writers appear to take a narrower view and consider the degraded performance to be a direct result of behaviors resulting from fear of incapacitation.

It should be noted that the contemporary definitions of suppression attempt to deal with observables, l.e., behaviors, while the earlier works relied on a purely mental concept of fear. It should also ba noted that these behavioral definitions objectively permit anchoring the ends of any suppression scale. If no decrement in performance can be observed (regardless of what Individual members of a force may state about the intensity of their fears), suppression is rated saro. If all observable behavior is devoted solely to the minimizing of personal risk, suppression is said to be complete or 100X. In other words, if the fire intensity is such that an individual devotes his total effort to aeeklng greater cover, he is totally suppressed. Increases in fire power beyond this intensity cannot therefore increase suppression. Despite these objectively defined end points, the measurement of the degree of suppression along the scale has proven to be difficult and controversial. For example, given a known level of fire, la it possible to relate the degree of suppression of a force with extremely limited mobility, but with the ability to observe the enemy and return fire, to that of a force with the ability to observe and maneuver, but with e limited capability of returning fire? Most likely, in either case the ability to observe the enemy will be the last function suppressed. However, the absolute or even the relative importance of each of these functions is difficult to establish. Furthermore, the degree of sup¬ pression is also dependent upon the mission. If he is adequately pro¬ tected and concealed, a soldier observing enemy movement may be hardly suppressed by enemy machinegun fire. Under the same conditions, the soldier whose mission is to advance on the enemy might well be totally suppressed.

It can be plausibly argued that at any given time, suppression is either total or nonexistent. For example, assume that an infantrymen is in a foxhole observing the enemy and firing as enemy personnel reveal themselves. Movement at this time is not a pert of his mission.

Further assume that machinegun fire suddenly begins to rake the ares.

The soldier will undoubtedly duck into his foxhole end abandon attempts to observe, return fire, or move. That is, he will be completely sup¬ pressed. However, shortly after the machinegun fire ceases, he will again observe and fire on the enemy. In thiB sequence of events, the soldier will go from being virtually unsuppreosed, to being totally suppressed, to being virtually unsuppressed again. Although not ex¬ plicitly stated as such, this line of thinking probably led the CDEC team^2 to view suppression as the percentage of time an individual was

12

Project Team II, op.

ait.

1-3

li li-i'k. 1 , jfc i**Li jrd'

unable to perform a specific assigned duty during a given period of time. If one is willing to assume that suppression is always either near 0 or near 100%, the "percent time suppressed" is a very reasonable measure of the degree of suppression. As can be seen, attempts to define, much leas measure, the degree of suppression have been fraught with problems.

In all of the literature located, the authors agreed that suppres¬ sion was a "temporary" phenomenon. However, the meanings attached to temporary were quite variable. Huggins, ^ reported on a CDEC Btudy in which a target was said to be suppressed if two projectiles passed with¬ in two meters of the target within an .04 minute time interval. The duration of suppression was .06 minutes, but could be extended for .01 minute for each projectile that passed within two meters of the target while it was suppressed. Translating this into seconds, the minimum suppression time appears to be 3.6 seconds, which is incremented by .6 seconds for each additional round. Kinney*^ states that "suppression is a short-term transient degradation...," and defines "short-term" as being "in the order of tens of seconds." The Ad Hoc Croup ^ points out that most suppression models use constant durations with suppression time tunning from 10 to 60 seconds. They question the use of these short periods by noting that in the recent Mideast: War, a nen-kiliing hit on the turret would cause a tank crew to stop activity for aB much as 8 to 10 minutes. Unfortunately, actual combat data relating type and intensity of fires, the range of individual behaviors, and the duration of suppression are practically nonexistent. Therefore, the current authors view these time estimates as merely "best guesses." Most attempts to determine the duration of suppression have been based on retrospective interviews of combat-experienced personnel. Variations in combat situ¬ ations such as the types and intensity of fires, thr> amount and kind of protection, the relative size of the opposing forces, and the experience and personalities of the individuals make it extremely difficult to systematically compare the recollections of different individuals. Furthermore, the validity of retrospective data is always suspect, particularly when any behaviors reported could reflect adversely on the Interviewee. Therefore, it is not surprising that the literature reports great variability in the estimated duration of suppression.

To further complicate the issue. Investigators have stated that suppression can be either "reasoned" or "unreasoned."^' Reasoned sup¬ pression is said to occur when an individual attempts to optimize the tradeoffs between his personal protection and the accompl Islunent of the mission. 'Unreasoned suppression is said to occur when the risk-reduc¬ tion behavior is far out of proportion to the actual threat. Unfortu¬ nately, what seemB reasoned to one may seem foolhardy to another, and

^Huggins, op. oil,

14

Kinney, op. oil.

15

US Department of the Army, op. oil.

16

Winter and Clovis, ,?;j. or l.

1-4

17

vice versa. As the Ad Hoc Group pointed out, "reasoned performance" in a given situation must be defined. How does the individual weigh hie personal survival against the importance of the mission? How does one realistically assess personal risk? Can the reasonableness of perfor¬ mance at any given time be evaluated in terms of percent casualties experienced? These and other similar questions must be answered before criteria for reasonableness can be determined. At first, it might seaai that an Individual who performed as if suppressed while not under fire was exhibiting "unreasoned performance." However, this is not neces¬ sarily the case. Suppression csn bs divided Into two categories— reactive and threat. Reactive suppression results from being taken under fire. Threat suppression occurs when there is a high probability of being taken under fire (especially if protection Is poor). Kinnay*® refers to this letter kind of suppression as "anticipatory" suppression. He states that anticipatory suppression is based on a future risk, while reactive suppression is based on a current risk.

Naylor^0 implies that weapons designers need more information than is supplied by definitions of suppression alone. The weapons designer needs to know the particular characteristics of a weapons system which are associated with specific behavioral responses. The earlier data generally indicate the proportion of respondents who reported fear of each of a particular set of weapons. Data on why the weapons were feared tends to be sparse. Naylor presents data from an earlier study indicating that such thingB as accuracy of fire, lack of warning, rapidity of fire, noise, and a lack of defense ware typically stated aa raasona for fsar of various weapons. Yet, inconsistencies existed. For example, noise was a frequently cited reason for fear of diva bombers. However, nolae did not appear to be a major factor in a fear of artil¬ lery shelling. Naylor's thesis is that wa know virtually nothing about the separate or combined contributions of weapons characteristics In terms of their effects on human behavior. In his point of view, ths problem is:

...really one of assessing t{ie effect of a par¬ ticular stimulus, which is occurlng under a particular set of circumstances or within a particular environment, upon the behavior of an individual or a group of individuals.

17

US Department of the Army, op. ext.

18 Ibid.

19

Kinney , op. oit.

20

J. C. Naylor, et al. Proceedings of the First Symposium on the Psychological Effects of Non-Nuclear Weapons, Volume I , University of Oklahoma Research Institute, Norman, April 29, 1964.

1-5

Stated somewhat differently, we will be able to effectively assess the psychological effects of weapons, or, to predict the responses to new weapons systems only when we are able to quantify both the stimuli associated with weapons and the responses obtained from use of these weapons.

At this Juncture, it might be well to examine why it is so impor¬ tant to predict the bahevlorel responses to the visual and auditory signatures of weapons. One reason, as Naylor pointed out, Is that such information might be useful in designing future weapons systems. How¬ ever, it ie also critical that ws know what responses should be expected to employment of existing weapons systems. Many decisions concerning the makeup and deployment of our armed forces are based on computer simulations of hypothetical future engagements. The results obtained are only as good as the input data and assumptions underlying the models used. Obviously, if suppression does in fact exist, then it should be played as part of the engagement. However, as was pointed out earlier in this discussion, attempts to model suppression heretofore have been baaed on "beet gueases" of the modelers. The variability in how sup¬ pression is handled in the different models indicates an urgent need for better date. Inaccurate modeling of suppressive effects can only lead to leas accurate decisions. Therefore, any data which improve the modeling efforts should be extremely useful. This research was initi¬ ated as an attempt to relate stimulus characteristics of selected mall come to psychologically scaled values of indexes of suppression and perceived dengerouenees of each of these weapons. Hopefully, the re¬ sults can be employed to improve combat models, and, as Naylor has suggested, provide useful information to weapons designers.

Chapter 2

RESEARCH PROBLEM AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Research Problem

2

Introduction. Kushnick and Duffy reported on a series of studies slued at relsting the characteristics of small arms to their suppression capability. In an effort to generate hypotheses, Hiey completed an ex¬ tensive review of the literature and conducted interviews with a large number of combat veterans. They concluded that miss distance, caliber, and rate of fire were the primary determinants of suppressive capabil¬ ity. Based on their analyses of the literature and Interview data, they designed a series of experiments to verify their hypotheses. In one of these studies, observers were placed In a pit and given a scenario de¬ scribing a hypothetical battle situation in which they were to Imagine they were Involved. Small arms were then fired over the pit from a range of 150 maters. Varying lateral miss distances were employed.

Miss distance was controlled by aiming the weapons at a series of tar¬ gets emplacdd on the opposite side of the pit from the weapons. After each sequence, observers were asked to select one of seven alternative . statements which would best describe their behavior under these circum¬ stances on an actual battlefield. These alternatives are shown In Table 2-1.

These alternatives were later scaled in terms of the amount of suppression each represents through the use of Delphi techniques. These scaled values are shown In the second column of Table 2-1.

Following this, each respondent's reply to each situation vas assigned the appropriate scale value, and the values were averaged across respondents and conditions to develop a suppression Index for each weapon. The weapons and their scale Suppression Index (SI) values are shown In Table 2-2.

In another experimental study, data on perceived dangerousness of live fire events were obtained in the same physical environment de¬ scribed above. However, rather than a behavioral type scale such as was used In developing the Suppression Index, dangerousnass was rated on a simple 7-polnt scale. The anchor points were "no personal danger" and "maximum dangerousness," Zt was concluded that the major factors producing a perception of dangerousness are the loudness of passing

^S. A. Kushnick and J. 0. Duffy. The Identification of Objeotive Relationehipa Between Small Avne Five Chavaoteviatioe and Effeotiveneee of Suppve8eive Five, TR 72/002, Final Report, Mellonics Systems Develop¬ ment, Litton Industries, Sunnyvale, California, 3 April 1972. (For a less technical version, see G. M. Glviden, "Weapons Effectiveness and Suppressive Fire," in Pvoaeedinge , 13th Annual US Army Operations Research Symposium AORS XIII, 29 Oct. - 1 Nov., 1974, Fort Lee, Virginia, Vol II, pp 503-513.

2-1

Table 2-1. Response Alternatives to Fire Events

Baaponee Alternative

Delphi Scale

k . Take cover ae beet 1 could, but wouldn't be able to obeerve or

fire on the enemy at all. 100

B. Take cover aa beat 1 could and would be able to observe the enemy occaaionally, but wouldn't be able to fire at the enemy at

all. 90

C. Take cover aa beat 1 could and would be able to obaerva the enemy continuoualy but wouldn’t be able to fire at the enemy at

all. 80

D. Take cover aa beat I could, and would be able to observe the enemy occasionally and fire at

the enemy occaaionally. 59

E. Take cover aa best I could, and would be able to observe the enemy continually and fire at

the enemy occasionally. 34

F. Take cover as beet I could, but would be able to observe the enemy continually and place

continuous fire on the enemy. 17

0. Would continue doing what I had been doing before the incoming fire and wouldn* t worry about

gattlng better cover. 0

Value

o

rounds, the proximity of putting rounds, and the volume of fires.

Since the proximity of passing rounds and the rates of fire w re held constant, it was concluded t at the loudness of the passing roundB was the primary determinant of differences in perceived dangerouanesa in the experiment. Loudness was believed to he closely related to the kinatlc energy of the projectiles as they paused near the subjects. Howavar, the relationship between kinetic energy and perceived dangerouanesa proved to be curvilinear. The tabled data, adapted from Kuahnlck and Duffy, are shown in Table 2-3. From this result, it can be concluded that either (a) kinetic energy is not linearly related to perceived loudness, or (b) other factors in the acoustic signature are at play in determining perceived dangerouanesa. It is interesting that the two weapons which caused the curvi linearity are those with the highest (XM645 flachstte) and lowest (.45 caliber) velocities. It is conceiv¬ able that the frequency spectrum and duration of the sounds from Chess projectiles at the extremes of velocity may affect their perceived dangerousness above and beyond the loudness component. However, Kuah¬ nlck and Duffy made no attempt to relate these characteristics to par- calved dangerousness. In fact, no data on projectile signatures wera obtained during the study. However, with interest in suppression still high, it was felt that it would be useful to determine whether or not other aspects of the auditory signatures of the projectiles could ba employed to Improve the prediction of perceived dangerouanesa. There¬ fore, this effort was initiated to (a) determine what information on tha auditory algnaturas was available or could be made available, and (b) to determine whether these data could be employed to improve tha prediction of tha paychologically-derived measures by physical measures.

Approach. As originally conceived, this effort was to be conducted in two phases. The initial phase was to be an attempt to locate data on tha auditory signatures of the small arms projectiles employed in the Kushnlck end Duffy studies. However, it was also deemed advisable to accomplish an update review of the literature to determine If any rele¬ vant work had been accomplished since the vary complete reviaw reported by Kushnlck and Duffy. A portion of the material reviewed was smploynd In the background discussion in Chapter 1. Additional discussion of the literature will follow in the next major section of this chapter.

The second phase of the effort was to be an attempt to relate the auditory signature data of the small arms projectiles to the psycho¬ logically-scaled values of suppression and perceived dangerousness. It was determined that only available data on auditory signatures should be used at this time. An attempt to obtain new data was viewed as too costly. The instrumentation required for obtaining accurate data on

2

Another study was conducted to determine the suppressive effect of the vieusl signatures of Impacting rounds. While these signatures were related to suppression, they did not play a part in the experiments in which the Suppression Index and the Perceived Dangerousness Index were derived.

Table 2-2. Suppression Scale Scores

Weapon	Mean SI	Standard Deviation
XM19	29.82	23.41
M16	35.10	22.83
AK47	36.44	24.84
H60	43.27	23.72
Caliber .30 MG	60.99	30.77

Table 2-3. Relationship Between Kinetic Energy (KE) and Perceived Dangerousness

Projectile	KE x 10“8	Perceived Danger ouaneas Index
Caliber .50	27.79	47
M60	3.63	41
AK47	2.20	39
Ml 6	1.33	37
Caliber .43	.93	27
XM643	.94	23

2- A

auditory signatures is highly sophisticated (e.g., see Garlnthsr and Moreland**), and simply not available. In addition, duplicating the conditions under which Kushnick and Duff's subjects perceived the pass¬ ing rounds would also be difficult. Therefore, it was felt that the available data should first be analyzed. If these data showed signifi¬ cant promise for predicting the psychological Beales, then a determina¬ tion would be made as to the desirability of obtaining new and more complete data on the auditory signatures.

Unfortunately, all of the data desired could not be located. Nevertheless, some further analysis of Kushnick and Duffy's data seasaed warranted. The results of this analysis are presented in Chapter 3.

Discussion of the Literature

The primary source of the literature obtained was the Defanss Docu¬ mentation Center (DDC). However, personnel at the Human Knglnearlng Laboratories (HEL) , Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) , Plcatinny Arsenal, the Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (ABHA), and the Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL) were also contacted in an effort to insure complatenesa. The emphasis in the searches was on the more recent literature; that is, literature published since the review by Kushnick and Duffy. However, because of their perceived high relevance, a number of documents referred to by Kushnick and Duffy were also obtained. An attempt was also made to limit the documents obtained to those which dealt with the suppression of infantry units, and/or suppression rs- sultlng from the use of small arms. A considerable portion of the effort was also invested in the search for auditory signature data of small arms. The search in DDC was complicated by the Inconsistency in the use of key words. For example, there were over AO entries for the M16 rifle and associated equipment. While it was possible through proper coding of entries to form some groups for the searches, the process was still quite tedious. For example, by use of proper input codes, it was possible to retrieve information on all documents having key words such as M~16, M-16 rifle, M-16 rifles, M-16 gun, and M-16 guns. However, separate searches had to be made for documents with key words such as M 16 and M16. Also, in order to retrieve documents related to suppression, a variety of key words such as suppression, fire suppression, and weapons systems effectiveness had to be employed. All In all, approximately 100 combinations of key words were employed in the DDC searches.

The general literature on suppression can be divided into three broad categories. The older documents were primarily reports of inter¬ view and/or questionnaire studies. The newer documents dealt primarily

J

0. R. Garlnthsr and J. B. Moreland. Trmeduoer Teohniquee for Measuring the Effect of Small -Arms Noioe on Hearing, Technical Memorandum 11-65, US Army Human Engineering Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, July 1965.

>-

letifa f

with field experiments or the development of models for use in gaming . However, few of the reports reviewed were "pure" in that they fell exclusively into one of the three categories. Also, many of the reports contained substantial theoretical or general discussions of the nature of the phenomenon of suppression. Nevertheless, for convenience of discussion, the literature reviewed will be divided into the three categories suggested above.

Interview and questionnaire studies, some of the general findings of the interview end questionnaire studies have already been presented in Chapter 1, and will not be repeated here. The reader Interested In a

more detailed unclassified review and discussion of .these studies is referred to Naylor, et al.,4' or Casey and Larimore." However, there are

a number of conjectures concerning interview and questionnaire studies that are of sufficient Interest for at least a brief mention. For

example, Palmer, et al. point out that data obtained from POWs need to be scrutinised very carefully before validity can bo assumed, as POWs may deliberately attempt to mislead the interviewer. Palmer, et al. also point out that many such studies employed structured Interviews which may have tended to lead the interviewees. Questionnaires also tend to be structured In nature. Palmer, et al, recommend the use of an unstructured Interview sa the most valid approach.

There is evidence from the interview and questionnaire data that familiarity with a weapon tends to reduce fear of that weapon. Or, in the case of the especially effective weapons, fear may actually In¬ crease. In other words, familiarity with weapons tends to make fears more realistic. That is, the relative fear of various weapons is likely to become more in keeping with the actual casualty-producing ability or lethality of the weapon, ae familiarity with the weapon Increases. However, this wee not always found to be the case. In some cases, greeter feer was expressed for those weapons which had most frequently been used egelnet the individual being questioned. Fear was also found to be associated with the reputation of a weapon. For example, US forces In Africa during WWII expressed great fear of the German "88" becauae of its reputation for extreme accuracy.

J. C. Naylor, et al. Proceedings of the First i'ynrpos ucn on the Payahologioal Effects of Non-Nuclear Weapons - Volume 1 , University of Oklahoma Research Institute, Norman, April 29, 1964.

^1. J. Casey end W. E. Lerimore. Para)>hyei,<al Variables in Weapon System Analysis, AR 66-1, Analytic Services, Inc., Falls Church, Virginia, April 1966.

^J. D. Palmar, et al. Investigation of Psychological Effects of Non-Nuclear Weapons for Limited Wav. Volume No. II, Experimental Studies, ATL-TR-65-39, Vol II, Directorate of Armament Development, Weapons Division (ATWR) , ERlin AFB, Florida, January 1966.

2-6

Although the evidence Is nor substantial, there are some indica¬ tions that fear of weapons Is at least in part culturally deterained. These data have been reviewed by Casey and Larlmore,'' They present data from Kahn® comparing the fears of Chinese Communist forces and North Koreans to United Nations weapons. A portion of these data is shown aa Table 2-4. However, Kahn suggests that other than cultural differences may account for the differences observed in the table. He suggests, for example, that different types of weapons may have bean used against the two forces, or that different proportions of combat-axparlenced soldiers may have served in the two armies represented. Casey and Larljaore also present data on fear responses to a first air raid. It was found that Russians wars laaa frightened than either French or Italians. Further, the Russians tended to fear large bombs the most out of fiva possibili¬ ties, while the French placed large bombE^ third. Both groups, along with Italians, placed incendiary bombs last.

Table 2-4. Most Feared United Nations Weapon a

Percent

Weapon

Chinese North Korean

Airplane

Strafing

Bombing

Napalm

Artillery

Machlneguns

Tanks

Tank Guns

Rifles

52	23
16	27
7	19
3	13
50	38
5	3
4	1
4	2
5	1

No. of Prisoners

238

305

The lnconaietency of reports concerning the affect of noise has already been mentioned in Chapter 1. That la, noise was vary frequently mentioned as a reason for fear of dive bombers, while it waa virtually never mentioned in connection with fear of artillery. Page, et el..

•7

Caaey and larimor?, ait. g

L. A. Kahn. A Preliminary Investigation of Chinese and North Korean Soldier Reactions to UN Weapons in the Korean War, ORO-T-14 (FEC) , Johns Hopkins University, 1952.

a

M. M. Page, et al. "Prior Art in the Psychological Effacta of Weapons Systems," in J. C. Naylor, et al., Proceedings of the First Symposium on the Psychological Effects of Non-Nuclear Weapons - Volums I, University of Oklahoma Research Institute, Norman, April 29, 1964.

2-7

point out that the British had little fear of "shrieking" bombs. This was because of the time they could be heard before they hit. Thus, they had ample warning and could take cover, rendering the bombs largely ineffective from the antipersonnel standpoint. This la in direct con¬ trast to the data on fear of the shrieking dive bomber cited earlier. However, the troops reporting fear of the dive bomber were in the open end therefore had little affordable protection. Hence, it can be seen that situational factors are extremely important In determining what characteristics of a weapon will produce fear.

Experimental studies, only two series of experimental studies were located in the literature search. One of those was the series of five studies reported by Kushnick and Duffy. 0 The general procedures em¬ ployed in most of this series has already been described in the Research Problem section. The first experiment was a "policy capturing" experi¬ ment designed to determine what personal as well, as weapon and scenario characteristics contributed to suppression ratings. It was during this experiment that the Suppression Index was derived. The second experi¬ ment was a miss distance estimation experiment, and the third dealt with the perceived dengerousness of various live fire events. The fourth etudy was designed to assess the suppressive effects of impact sip, na¬ turae, and the fifth to determine whether physiological responses were correlated with the psychological responses to live fire events. Data collection for the impact signature study differed somewhat from the other experiments. Rounds were actually fired into the ground approxi¬ mately 15 maters in front of the pit, and subjects observed the impacts through periscopes. The general conclusions drawn from this series of studies were: (1) the major factors producing suppression are the loud¬ ness of passing rounds, the proximity and number of passing rounds, and th i signatures associated with roundB impact ing. (2) Within the limits of *;ha study, suppression was shown to (a) decrease in a linear fashion with increasing miss distance, (b) to increase linearly with increases in rate of fire or volume of fire, and (c) to Increase in a linear fashion with increases in the perceived loudness of passing projectiles. This series of studies by Kushnick and Duffy will also be referred to hereafter as the Litton studies.

The US Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command (USACDEC) conducted a series of suppression experiments employing a wide variety of both direct and indirect fire weapons. Data from two of the more relevant experiments have been summarized in a 1976 publication. The intent of these studies was to determine the proximity of fire required

■^Kushnick and Duffy, op, ait.

11

Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, US Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command, Fort Ord, California. USACDEC Suppraeaion Experimentation Data Anah/ttin It port, April 1976.

2-8

to suppress at the .5 and .9 probability levels, and to determine the volume of fires required to obtain the warm.' suppression levels. The suppreesees were ATCM gunners who simulated the engagement of a ma¬ neuvering armored element with an antitank missile. However, the suppreesees did not have the capability of engaging the base of suppres¬ sive fires. The ATGM gunners used periscopes to detect, acquire, end track the armored vehicles. In order to motivate the ATGM gunners, rewards were given based on points obtained. The defenders were given maximum points for fully exposing their periscopes in firing at the enemy. Fewer points were awarded for partially exposing the periscopes and observing without firing, and no points were awarded for keeping the periscope down in the foxhole unable to fire or to observe. Negative points were given if the periscope was hit by the suppressive fire. It was assumed that each ATGM gunner would have to remain exposed for IS seconds to complete the engagement. That is, If a gunner withdrew his periscope during the course of the engagement, it was assumed that the missile wee "lost" and that the engagement would have to be re-initi- ated. Suppressive fire wbb placed at predetermined points in a pre*~ determined pattern and rate by a team of "attackers." The likelihood that an ATGM gunner would be suppressed at each of several miss dis¬ tances was determined empirically for each weapon Involved. Weapons employsd in the CDEC studies which were also employed in the Litton study were the .50 caliber machinegun, the M60 machinegun, and the H16A1 rifle. It was discovered that the probability of suppression is Influ¬ enced by proximity of fire in a relatively orderly or predictable manner. It wee possible to model radial miss distance in meters by the following equation:

RMD - AeB

PCS)

Where: RMD is the miss distance In meterB

P(S) is the probability pf suppression

A and B are constants associated with each specific weapon type.

For the M60 machinegun, A ■ 89.556 and B » 5.395. Figure 2-1 presents e curve drawn through points computed for miss distances of .5, 1, 3, 6, 10, 15, and 20 meters. As can be seen, a miss distances of 6 meters results in a .5 probability of suppression, while a miss distance of lees then 1 meter is required for a .9 probability of suppression. It should be noted that the data entering into each of the models wee based on the results of all of the studies in which a particular weapon was involved, if the data were considered valid.

Probability of Suppression

Figure 2-1, Probability of suppression as a function of radial tidsa distance

Another CDEC study Investigated the effect of concealment on aup- pression. As might be expected, targets in concealed poaitiona ware leaa suppressed than those in visible positions. However, an intareat¬ ing but unexpected result was obtained. There waB a consistent tendency for the M16A1 in the semi-automatic mode to be more suppressive than in the automatic mode. In other words, rounds fired singly over a 30-second period tended to be more suppressive than rounds fired in 3-round bursts when the same total number of rounds were fired per unit of time. The authors speculate on this finding thusly:

Since automatic fire is often believed to be more suppressive, the M16A1 on eeml-automatic should have bsen the leaBt suppressive of the dispersions used. The results indicate that this may not be true; in fact, the aeoi-auto- matlc condition tanded to be one of the moat aupprasslve dispersions. Since 18 rounds per event were fired in each of the seven disper¬ sions, there were six opportunities to suppress targets in the three-round burst mode, and 18 such opportunities in the semi-automatic mode during each 30 second trial. Therefore, the greater volume of fire associated with each trigger pull on the three-round burst may not compensate for the increased number of trigger pulls available with the same number of rounds in the semi-automatic mode. When the targets were visible, each trigger pull often was in direct response to sighting a target; there¬ fore, the targets could be suppressed more times during a trial by the semi-automatic mode. The fact that the semi-automatic mode received a more suppressive ranking for visible than concealed targets supports this conjecture.

It seems to the present authors that an attempt should be made to repli¬ cate the finding just described. If the finding can be replicated, it should prove useful to both commanders and to weapons designers. The ability to fire rounds singly saves both ammunition and wear and tear on weapons, and may be equally or more effective in suppressing a hostile force.

One major difference between the CDEC studies and the Litton studies was that CDEC relied largely on objective data, while Litton

12

Project Team II, US Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command, and Braddock, Dunn, and McDonald Scientific Support Labora¬ tory, Fort Ord, California. Viepereion Against Concealed. Targete (PACTS), USACDEC Expeinment FC 023, Final Report, July 1975.

2-11

2 ^

relied on subjective data. However, only one notable discrepancy in the conclusions drawn has been detected. Data from the CDEC study were suggestive of a logarithmic relationship between miss distance and level of suppression (see Figure 2-1). The Litton study concluded that "with¬ in the limits of the study," suppression wbb found to decrease in a linear fashion with increasing miss distance. However, the explanation for this apparent difference may be found in differences in the experi¬ mental procedures employed. In the CDEC studies described, the rounds mey have actually passed closer to the observers than in the Litton study. Also, though it ia not stated in the reports, the observers may have seen muzzle flashes and observed round impacts as they were em¬ ploying periscopes above ground level. In the Litton studies where the Suppression Index and Perceived DangerouaneBB Index were derived, the observers were below ground and had no opportunity to observe muzzle flashes or impacts. Furthermore, the targetB at which the weapons were fired ware above ground level. From the description presented In the Litton report, the present authors estimate that the nearest miss dis¬ tance wee approximately 3.5 meters. Note that in Figure 2-1, that moat of the curvilinearlty occurs below 3.5 meters. That is, the curve Is relatively straight at ranges from 3.5 meters up. If only these data were available, it would be easy to conclude that the relationship was linear. Tha CDEC reports present no data relative to the Litton con¬ clusion that suppression increases with the perceived loudness of pass¬ ing projectiles. Both sets of studies conclude that the proximity and number of passing rounds are associated with suppressive behavior.

Model S

General aonaideratione .

The belief that suppression does, in fact, exist, and does affect the outcome of battles, has provided the impetus for the development of mathematical models of suppression for inclusion in computer battle simulations. To the extent that the models realistically portray sup¬ pression affects, the computer simulations are improved. However, the authors of virtually all the documents describing model development admit that the model's are based on assumptions and require validation. Furthermore, the assumptions vary from model to model. For example, in tha FAST-VAL model, ^ it is assumed that an attacking battalion will break when they have 20% casualties and an attacking company will break when they have 30% casualties. It is further assumed that a defending

13

CDEC also collected subjective data during the DACT5 study but found it more variable than the objective data, and therefore, placed greater reliance on the objective data.

14

S. G. Spring and S.. H. Miller. FAGT-VAl,: Ho.lat.vonohvpo Among Casualties , Suppre onion, <md the Perfonnannn of t'nmpawj-Gi: te Lfriit.it,

RM-6268-PR, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, March 1970.

2-12

i

battalion will break when they reach 40 % casualties and a defending company will break when they reach 50% casualties. Johnson’6 points out that the theater battle model assumes that an attacker breaks contact when he suffers 15% casualties, while a defender breaks contact after suffering 30% casualties. Obviously, both sets of these assump¬ tions cannot be correct. Also, the use of a fixed percentage doss not seen to bs realistic. An Operations Research Office report**9 describes the snslysls of a number of battles in which US forces were both in attack and defensive postures. The breakpoints proved to be quite variable from battle to battle. All of the conditions leading to this variation could not be ascertained. However, such factors at the total length of the battle and the availability of reinforcements appear to be factors. The authors also suggest that the quality of leadership and expsrlenct of ths personnel may have been factora. The influence of factors such ss these must be determined before the models can be re¬ fined.

As discussed in Chapter 1, there ia also disagreement on the dura¬ tion of suppression. The Ad Hoc Group^ noted that most models assume constant durations of 10 to 60 seconds. Again, the employment of a constant value seems unrealistic. Concealment, for example, was shown by CDECJS to be related to suppression time, with concealed targets being leas suppressed than targets in the open. Other fectore ere undoubtedly Involved. However, refinement of this espect of the models must wait the eccumulation of data delineating the contribution of the various factors. Further experimental research, end possibly further analysis of past battles, are required.

Work conducted by the Systems Research Center at the University of Oklahoma suggests tha difficulties that are likely to be encountered In attempts to refine battle simulations to fully account for psychological

15

E. C. Johnson, Jr. "The Effect of Suppression on the Casualty Exchange Ratio," Masters Thesis, Navel Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1973.

IS

D. K. Clark. Casualties as a Measure of the Loss of Combat Effectiveness of an Infantry Battalion, TM-ORO-T-289, Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, August 1954.

17

US Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition, Washington, D.C. Report of the Amy Scientific Advisory Panel Ad Hoc Group on Fire Suppression, ODCSRDA Form 11, 7 July 1975.

1 8

Project Team II, op. cit.

2-13

1 ')

variables. For example, Terry, et al., ' formulated a psychological index of weapons effectiveness. They described the psychological index as "a system of measurements. vh:.i. will permit quantitative description of the psychological effects o' v gone." The index is referred to as the SRC Psychological Index, where S stands for signature value, R for reputation value, and C for context value. The signature variables are sound spectrum, sound intens tty, 1 ight spectrum, light intensity, injury capability, and flame capability. Despite the multiplicity of factors considered, Terry, et al., did not mention impact signatures, which the Litton studies showed did affect psychological ratings. The reputation variables are familiarity, experience, predictability, forewarning, accuracy, lethality, countermeasures, and protection. Under context ere listed 16 force variables, 10 unity variables, and 4 leadership vari¬ ables. Force refers to those factors relevant to the degree of military might which can be employed by an enemy. Unity variables are those which are relevant to the cohesiveness of an enemy unit, and Include such things as propaganda effects, the reputation of the unit, and their personal motives. The leadership variables pertain to leadership quality. As can be seen, assuming that all of the variables listed by Terry and co-workers are relevant to the psychological effects of a weapon, pre¬ diction of the effects is exceedingly complex. Terry, et al., were not dealing specifically with suppression, but with psychological effects in general. However, it is certainly conceivable that all of the variables mentioned might be factors in the suppressive capability of a weapons system.

20

Page, et al., delve into the responses to weapons systems. They state that weapons-specif ic variables (e.g., weapon efficiency, visual aspects, noise, duration, etc.) and situational variables (available protection, proximity, leadership, mobility, etc.) form the stimulus corplex which Impinges on the individual human, These variables inter¬ act with personal characteristics, which they refer to as organismic variables. Organismic variables are defined as experience, expecta¬ tions, personal involvement, physiological condition, and predisposition. The result is a set of responses. These responses are divided by Page, et al., into immediate behavioral changes and long-range behavioral changes. Immediate changes include such things as panic, immobility, fatigue, poor performance, and flight or escape behavior. Long-range changes might be lowered morale, irrational thinking, regression, or even neurotic and psychotic disorders. This concept by Page, et al., of course, assumes a behavioral response which is desirable from the stand¬ point of the weapon user. Otherwise, the weapon would have no relevant psychological effect.

^R. A. Terry, et al. Development of Weapons Design Criteria Based on the SBC Payaho logioa l Index: An Investigation of Signature , Depu¬ tation and Context E f feats t Technical Report AFATL-TR-8 7-185, Air Force Armament Laboratory, Air Force Systems Command, Eglin AFB, Florida, October 1967.

^Page, et al , , <>p. -‘it.

I',

i . •

The work of Page, et al., and Terry, pt al., does illustrate the complexity of the problem of predicting the psychological effects of weapons. However, It should be noted that the problem posed for this present research is less complex. Kushnick and Duffy noted that their respondents were reacting primarily to the sounds of the passing pro¬ jectiles. What Terry, et al. refer to as context variables probably played an insignificant role. The situation or scenario given to each respondent was only briefly described* and the responses were limited to the seven choices presented. Organiamic variablaa undoubtedly did coma into play. That la, each individual reacted in hia own individual manner. No attempt, however, wae made to measure theee variables other than to obtain a very limited amount of biographical information. There¬ fore, our present concern is almost solely with the aignature variablaa.

Huggins ■* presents an explanation of how the suppression phaonome- non works.. Once a fire fight is Initiated, all combatants tend to taka cover. The next reaction is to assume a firing position and attempt to locate targets on which to deliver aimed fire. If no targets can be detected, a normal reaction is to deliver area fire at the assumed tar¬ get location. Thualy, the fire fight tends to restrict the movement of tha individual combatants. If one aide ia able to Increase its firs, the other side is forced to take greater cover, is less able to detect targets, and therefore, it less able to return fire. In this manner, one side tends to assume fire superiority and the other side la said to be suppressed. The more one side is suppressed, the less they can deliver fire, and therefore the degree of suppression increases as tha opposing aide is able to deliver even greater voluaea of fire. In theory at laaat, one aide could become totally aupprasaad, allowing the other aide to maneuver freely against them. However, In practice, there la a limit to the amount of fire any one aide csn dsllvsr. Wsapon wssr and ammunition supplies dictate some restraint. Also, unless soma of the fires are lethal, the suppression will only result in a delay end not s victory. In other words, the purpose of suppression appears to be that of gaining the advantage in mobility and the ability to observe, but mtytyt be followed by lethal fire in order to achieve e victory.

Tepee"" also discusses the purpose of suppression. He feels that it is s harassment designed to fatigue the enemy by Interference with work- rest cycle and biorhythms. Ideally, tha harassment weapons should

21

A. L. Huggins, Jr. "A Simplified Model for the Suppressive Effects of Small Arms Fire," Misters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 1971.

28

D. I. Tepas. "Some Relationships Between Behavioral and Physio¬ logical Measures During a 48-Hour Period of Harassment; A Laboratory Approach to Psychological Warfare Hardware Development Problems, " in J. C. Naylor, et al., Proceedings of the First Symposium oyi the Fsy - ohologioal Effects of Non-Nuolear Weapons - Volume I, University of Oklahoma Research Institute, Norman, April 29, 1964.

fatigue the enemy to the extent that he eventually falls into a deep sleep, and is therefore completely suppressed. That this may actually happen is attested to by an incident reported by Page, et al.2^ They

state;

An example of hyperreaction is given in a report from a company pinned down while on the offensive in Korea. While undergoing intense fire and in¬ fighting for several, hours, officers reported at mid-day that their most difficult problem was keeping the men awake and firing their weapons.

This feeling of fatigue and extreme sleepiness, where it was not physically justified, was an avoidance hyperreaction to an especially in¬ tense weapons effect.

Tiedemann and Young*'^ present an interesting notion on suppression which Is essentially weapons-independent. They suggest that successive impacts of rounds coming closer and closer to an individual are likely to be more suppressive than rounds going in the other direction, or rounds randomly placed, or all hitting in the same spot. Whether this is true or not, it has a logical appeal. It might even be assumed that Impacts at successively greater distances from an individual would hardly have any suppression effects at all.

2b

Burt, et al., report on an interesting finding which certainly seems to be related to suppression. In an analysis of several battles, it was found that as artillery strength increased, the relative propor¬ tion of casualties by artillery decreased. The same apparently contra¬ dictory relationship was also found for small arms. This may be ex- pi lined in part by assuming that Increases in one kind of fire power caused personnel to take cover from that kind of fire power. However, it is difficult to Imagine that personnel taking cover from artillery fire would not also be protected from small arms fire. Nevertheless, Burt, et al., suggest this possibility. They state;

It seemB reasonable to expect that when the enemy artillery fire power is great, stronger friendly bunkers are constructed and unnecessary friendly movement ia curtailed. Tn addition, Increased

f) a

‘' Page, et al.,

24 . .

A. F. Tiedemann, Jr. and R. B. Young. Index of Promxtty: A

Technique for Scoring Suppressive Fire, ER 6419, AAI Corporation, Balti¬ more Maryland, October 1970.

^ j , A. Burt, et al. Distribution of Combat Casualties by Caueative Agents, Technical Memorandum RAC-T-445, Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, Virginia, March 1965.

2-16

enemy artillery fire power may have been employed to allow the enemy infantry to come into direct contact with the friendly forces where they would make use of their amall-arms weapons. This would reduce the percentage of casualties caused by artillery but increase the percentage caused by enemy small arms.

The authors also point out that their data are based on the relative or proportionate number of casualties. That is, lncraaaaa in artillery fire power may also cause increases in the absolute number of casual¬ ties, but msy still comprise a relatively smaller proportion of the total casualties.

In closing this genera^ discussion section, reference la mads to the work Winter and Clovis, who followed up on the earlier work by Kushnick and Duffy. These authors were unable to find any quanti¬ tative data on suppressive effects. Due to this lack, they analysed over 100 anecdotal reports of combat situations from WWII, Koras, and Vietnam. The level of suppression was determined Judgmtntally by com¬ paring the behaviors described in the various reports. Unfortunately, quantitative data on a number of crucial variables such aa volumes of fire were not available. Therefore, considerable subjectivity was in¬ volved in the analysis. They searched specifically for data on sig¬ natures, including visual, auditory, olfactory, seismic, and thermal signatures. They divided signatures into platform signatures, initi¬ ation algnaturas, trajectory signatures, and terminal algnaturas. Supprasslvs sffscts were noted on the ability to firs, move, observe, and cossaunicata . The authors concluded that the "expected fraction of casualties," or lethality expectations associated with the weapon, takes into account all of the multiplicity of characteristics considered by others. Therefore, the model they developed had one parameter for weapons performance and one for "subjective aspects associated with human beings. This conclusion, that lethality is the only weapon parameter Involved In suppression, certainly has appeal. If true, weapon signatures as such play no part in suppression except as recog¬ nition aids. That is, if the signature Identifies the weapon as being of high lethality, it will lead to greater suppressive behavior.

However, the present authors feel that this approach is too simplistic, aa lethality la only one of a number of relevant factors. Other studies have consistently shown that fear of a weapon and its casualty-producing ability are not perfectly related, even among highly experienced battle veterans, But, until the contribution of other factors, if any, can be determined, the use of a single factor such as lathallty msy be the bast approach. With regards to the human factors Involved, these authors

26

R. P. Winter and E. R. Clovis. Relationship of Supporting Weap¬ on Systems Perfomanoe Characteristics to Suppreeeion of Individuate and Small Unite, TR 73/002, Defense Sciences Laboratories, Mellonics Systems Development Division, Litton Systems, Inc., Sunnyvale, Cali¬ fornia, January 1973.

2-17

make an Interesting recommendation. They recommend that no further experimentation on suppression be done. They feel that the suppression phenomenon is too complex and that the state-of-the-art in the behav¬ ioral sciences is not sufficiently advanced to yield any results of

practical value.

Invariant models.

No attempt was made to locate information on all of the computer battle simulations devised by the military services. Many of the models originally examined did not play suppression at all, and will not be discussed here, There are undoubtedly others which do play suppression on which no information was located during the literature search. A complete reporting and description of the models reviewed did not seem necessary, as they had much in common. Therefore, the models which will be briefly discussed below should be considered as only a sampling of the total universe.

The models developed to date are largely Invariant. That is, there is no "human factor" built into the assumptions. A given fire event in a given circumstance always results in the same degree and duration of suppression. This does not mean that the authors do not realize that a human factor exists. Most admit that it does, but that they lack the means for quantifying it. So, in essence, the models assume an "aver¬ age" behavioral response on the part of the suppressed force. However, as discussed earlier, there is a notable lack of agreement on such things as the duration of suppression and the breakpoints (in terms of percent casualties) at which a force will abandon its mission.

A brief review of some of the major features or characteristics of lome of these models is presented below.

a. Kushnick and Duffy used kinetic energy of the projectiles as a first approximation of the suppressive effects of a weapon. (See pages 2-1 through 2-3 of this chapter.) As mentioned earlier, they found that a curvilinear relationship existed between kinetic energy and perceived dangerousness. This particular finding will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3. The authors do acknowledge that factors such #8 the nature of the mission, availability of cover, combat experience, training, time in combat, and basic psychological makeup of the individual do mediate the suppressive effects of weapons. However, they make no attempt to deal with these variables in studying the relationship between kinetic energy and individual variations in perceived danger ousnesB . They present data dealing with only the average of the responses.

2?

b. Aiken, et al., employing the data obtained by Kushnick and Duffy, attempted to 9cale weapons effects between 0 and 10OX suppres-

A. C. Aiken, W. L. Phillips, and I>. V. Strlroling. "Individual Suppression as Induced by Direct Fire Solid Projectile Weapons: Itu Effect and Duration," (U) , ART paper, '(0 April 197b.

H Ion . To do thin, tlioy viMHumed LluiL no flruu would roBuJt in no nup- presuion, and Chat a specific level and proximity of fireB from a given weapon would result in 100% suppression. Employing Che kinetic energy of projectiles, they were able to derive constants for their equations which relate all fires to this scale. However, they were quick to point out that once suppression reached 100%, that no additional fires could result in a greater degree of suppression. In other words, once the critical level of fires was achieved and suppression was complete. Increasing fires would have no further suppressive effect and would therefore be wasteful.

28

c. Kinney, though concerned with the development of a model for predicting suppression effects from fragmenting explosive warheads, assumes that miss distance is the only criterion for determining sup¬ pressive behavior. However, since various miss distances for various weapons represent different kill probabilities, he assumes that is actually the physical variable which induces the psychological response of suppression.

d. Like Kinney, Tiedemann and Young^ assume that the proximity of Impacting rounds is the determinant of suppressive behavior, and they develop an index based on impact distances. Moreover, they state that successively closer impacts result in greater suppression than Impacts at successively greater distances. However, they make no attempt to deal with individual differences or the effects of specific signatures of weapons systems.

30

e. Burt, et al. attempted to relate such things as enemy per¬ sonnel strength, artillery fire power, small arms fire power, ammunition supply, and weather to the Incidence of casualties caused by either artillery, small arms, bombs, etc. Other qualitative variables were considered, such as terrain, vegetation, and morale, but were discarded because data were simply not reliable or were Incomplete, Ammunition supply was discarded because data were not available In many instances. Burt and his co-workers analyzed data for five WWII battles and 16 Korean battles. They obtained a multiple correlation of .85 for pre¬ dicting casualties from artillery, and a correlation of .77 for predict¬ ing casualties from small arms. However, conflicting results were obtained in the validation attempt. The equations <